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The Rise and Decline of the
Intellectual Property Powers
PETER K. Yu*
INTRODUCTION
Since its reopening to foreign trade in the late 1990s, China has
been the poster child of intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting.'
Virtually every year, the Office of the United States Trade Representative
* Copyright @ 2012 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and
Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School. This Article
was presented at the Campbell Law Review Symposium on "The New Global Conver-
gence: Intellectual Property, Increasing Prosperity, and Economic Networks in the
Twenty-First Century" at Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University.
Earlier versions of the Article were also presented as a keynote luncheon address at the
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law Symposium on "Applications of Intellec-
tual Property Law in China" at John Marshall Law School, as keynote presentations at the
Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia Conference on "The Rise of Innova-
tive China: Implications for the Region" at the University of Technology, Sydney and the
University of Melbourne, and as presentations at the 2012 IPR Nanhu Forum in Shenz-
hen, China organized by Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, the Conference on
"China's New Environment for Intellectual Property" at Fordham University School of
Law, and the University of Detroit Mercy Law Review Symposium on "The Future of Intel-
lectual Property" at University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. The Author is grateful to
Howard Abrams, Mark Cohen, Benjamin Liu, and Lucas Osborn for their kind invita-
tions and hospitality and the participants of these events for their valuable comments
and suggestions. He would like to thank Michael Crook, Teresa Blake, and their highly
efficient staff for patience and thoughtful editing, and Lindsey Purdy for excellent re-
search and editorial assistance. Part I of this Article draws on research from the Author's
earlier article in the Cardozo Law Review.
1. For the Author's earlier discussions on piracy and counterfeiting in China, see
generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode 11): Protecting Intellectual Proper-
ty in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Part-
ners Ill; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, Chi-
na Puzzle]; Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR.
REV. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom].
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(USTR) lists China on its watch list or priority watch list.2 The country's
piracy and counterfeiting problems have also been frequently mentioned
in connection with international intellectual property enforcement initi-
atives, such as the highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement 3 (ACTA) and the equally problematic domestic legislative
proposals for heightened copyright enforcement.' In a recent report, the
International Trade Commission estimated that "firms in the U.S. [intel-
lectual property]-intensive economy that conducted business in China
in 2009 reported losses of approximately $48.2 billion in sales, royalties,
or license fees due to [intellectual property rights] infringement in Chi-
na."5
While piracy and counterfeiting have been the focus of U.S. policy-
makers and the mainstream media for the past two decades, recent years
have seen the emergence of another very interesting debate concerning
China's rapid technological rise and its focus on alternative forms of in-
novation.6 As John Orcutt and Shen Hong recently observed, China has
2. The notable exception is during the honeymoon period following China's acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. In April 2005, the USTR ele-
vated China back to the Priority Watch List. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra
note 1, at 925.
3. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i-property/pdfsactal105_en.pdf [hereinafter
ACTA]. See generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011)
(criticizing the use of the "country club" approach to negotiate ACTA); Peter K. Yu, En-
forcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Yu,
What Enforcement?] (suggesting ways to improve the design of an anticounterfeiting
trade agreement); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV.
975 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears] (discussing the serious concerns about
ACTA).
4. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011
(PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). For criticisms of SOPA and PIPA, see generally Pe-
ter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property Enforcement, DRAKE L.
REV. DISCOURSE, June 2012, at 16, available at http://students.lawdrake.edullawReview/
docs/lrDiscourse201206-yu.pdf [hereinafter Yu, Alphabet Soup]; Letter from Prof. John R.
Allison et al. to Members of the U.S. Cong. (july 5, 2011) (opposing PIPA). In the inter-
est of full disclosure, the Author has signed on to the law professors' letter in opposition
to PIPA.
5. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBLICATION NO. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY xiv (2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf.
6. For discussions of innovation in China, see generally DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL
MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN: GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA (2011); JOHN L. ORCUTT & SHEN HONG, SHAPING CHINA'S
INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION (2011); TAN
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made many notable achievements in space technology, biotechnology
(including genomics and stem cell research), information technology,
nanotechnology, and advanced energy technology:
* China is one of only three countries to put a person in space
with its own rockets (and China recently conducted its first
spacewalk).
* Chinese research teams helped to map the genome for rice and
have since helped to extend genomic sequencing to other
plants, as well as a variety of insects and parasites.
* China passed the United States as the leading exporter of infor-
mation-technology goods in 2004.
* China has become a world leader in the field of nanotechnolo-
gy-producing major nanotechnology breakthroughs (e.g., im-
proved production of carbon nano-tubes) and generating a sig-
nificant portion of the world's nanotechnology publications and
patents and new nanotechnology firms.
* China has long been a leader in nuclear technology and is posi-
tioned to become a leader in a number of other energy fields,
including clean coal and hydropower.
Today, China is already among the top five countries filing patent
applications through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).8 In 2011,
the number of applications filed under that treaty increased by 33.4% to
16,406, earning China the fourth spot, behind only the United States,
Japan, and Germany.' Among all the applicants, ZTE Corp. and Huawei
Technologies, respectively, had the largest and third largest number of
PCT applications, while Panasonic ranked the second.'o With significant
backing from the Chinese government and the anticipated involvement
of the world's largest public sector, China will likely catch up with the
existing intellectual property powers more quickly than many are pre-
pared for.
YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: How CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING THE WORLD (2011);
ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR: How CHINESE COST
INNOVATION Is DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007).
7. ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at ix.
8. Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., International Patent Filings Set New
Record in 2011 (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/enjarticles/
2012/article_0001.html.
9. Id. The estimated figures for the United States, Japan, and Germany are 48,596,
38,888, and 18,568, respectively.
10. Id.
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Notwithstanding these many impressive economic and technologi-
cal developments, the narrative about piracy and counterfeiting in China
is rarely linked to the narrative about China's technological rise. In fact,
commentators who recount developments concerning these two narra-
tives rarely talk to each other. To provide a more comprehensive pic-
ture, and a deeper understanding of the implications of China's im-
provements in the intellectual property arena, this Article brings togeth-
er these two different narratives to explore what their combination
would mean for the United States and its intellectual property industries.
Part I delivers some good news for intellectual property rights hold-
ers from around the world that conduct business in China. It points out
that China is at the cusp of crossing over from a pirating nation to a
country respectful of intellectual property rights. This Part draws on the
historical developments of intellectual property protection in the United
States and other once-developing countries.
Part II bears some bad news for intellectual property rights holders.
It shows that, even though China will finally experience improvements
in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights when it
hits the proverbial crossover point, such improvements will bring some
disappointments. This Part focuses on three unintended consequences
brought about by rapid and dramatic improvements in the Chinese intel-
lectual property system: (1) an intellectual property litigation explosion
in China; (2) the United States' reduced competitive edge over China;
and (3) barriers to future intellectual property reform in the United
States.
In light of both the good and bad news delivered in the first two
Parts, Part III offers suggestions on three types of policy changes that
could help prepare U.S. industries for the challenges identified in the Ar-
ticle. Specifically, this Part examines the need to revamp domestic, bila-
teral, and multilateral policies. Although this Part focuses primarily on
U.S. policies, it is important to remember that a satisfactory response to
the challenges identified in Part 11 will require more than unilateral ac-
tion on the part of the United States.
Part IV concludes on a more comforting note. This Part explains
why, despite all these challenges, the United States may still have time
and wiggle room to decide its course of action in the near future. It nev-
ertheless underscores the need for intellectual property policymakers to
take seriously China's technological rise and the challenges identified in
the Article.
[Vol. 34:525528
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1. THE CROSSOVER POINT
A. The Chinese Experience
Piracy and counterfeiting has been the subject of a perennial dis-
pute between China and the United States since the former's re-opening
to foreign trade in the late 1980s. While the U.S. administration and
American rights holders were initially patient, especially in view of the
potential for opening up what could be the world's largest market for
U.S. goods and services, their patience slowly eroded." During the
1980s and 1990s, the United States repeatedly threatened China with
economic sanctions, trade wars, nonrenewal of most-favored-nation sta-
tus, and opposition to China's entry into the World Trade Organization
(WTO)." In response, China made several major revisions to its intel-
lectual property laws." The country also undertook considerable insti-
tutional reforms while joining more than a dozen international intellec-
tual property treaties." In December 2001, China finally became the
143rd member of the WTO, assuming obligations under the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" (TRIPS
Agreement).
As of this writing, the levels of protection and enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights in China still have not met the satisfaction of the
U.S. government and its supportive intellectual property rights holders.
Nevertheless, such protection and enforcement has dramatically im-
proved. In fact, the biggest challenge for intellectual property rights
holders in China is no longer about the low standards of protection, but
11. See Warren H. Maruyama, U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Proper-
ty, and the Rule of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND
PRACTICE 165, 186 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999) ("At a 1985 meeting to the U.S.-
China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the U.S. for the first time ex-
pressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR standards. In 1987, the U.S. put IPR protec-
tion on the agenda for U.S.-China market access talks.").
12. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 1, at 140-51.
13. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 975-99 (examining the
progress China has made in the intellectual property area); Yu, China Puzzle, supra note
1, at 185-88 (tracing the development of the intellectual property regime in China).
14. See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 1 (identifying the various international trea-
ties of which China is a member).
15. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited June 22, 2012).
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 108
Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994).
2012]1 529
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the limited effectiveness in enforcement." Enforcement problems have
created challenges for rights holders in not only the intellectual property
area, but across the board in the whole country." As far as intellectual
property rights are concerned, the enforcement problems are well illu-
strated by the complaint the United States filed before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body in April 2007.'"
Notwithstanding these enforcement problems, China has actively
pursued an intellectual property agenda. In June 2008, the State Council
adopted a pioneering National Intellectual Property Strategy,20 which
provides a comprehensive plan to improve the protection and manage-
ment of intellectual property rights while emphasizing the need for ac-
tive development of home-grown intellectual property (zizhu zhishi
chanquan) .21 The top Chinese leadership has also increasingly recog-
nized the economic and strategic importance of a well-functioning intel-
lectual property system. As President Hu Jintao remarked in the Group
Study of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party in May 2006:
Strengthening the building of China's system of intellectual property
right and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, management,
protection and application regarding intellectual property are our urgent
need for the purpose of enhancing independent and self-driven innova-
tion capabilities and building an innovation-oriented country."
17. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 95 (2005) ("[While China has made significant progress in its
efforts to make its framework of laws, regulations and implementing rules WTO-
consistent, serious problems remain, particularly with China's enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights.").
18. See generally CHEN JIANFU, CHINESE LAw: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 653-92
(2008) (providing an excellent discussion of the implementation and enforcement prob-
lems within the Chinese legal system).
19. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16,
2007). For the panel report on and further discussions of the dispute, see Panel Report,
China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009); Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L.
REV. 1046 (2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U.
INT'LL. REV. 727 (2011).
20. STATE COUNCIL, COMPENDIUM OF CHINA NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY (2008).
21. See id. 17; see also Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The Development
of the Intellectual Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 121 (2009) (discussing the
importance of "self-driven" intellectual property).
22. Wu, supra note 21, at 120; see also PANG LAIKWAN, CREATIVITY AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: CHINA'S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES
[Vol. 34:525530
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Taking the lead of President Hu and other leaders, the State Intellectual
Property Office (SIPO) set very ambitious goals for its National Patent
Development Strategy (2011-2020). Included in the 2015 targets are
the following goals:
The annual quantity of applying for patents for inventions, utility models
and designs [in China] will reach 2 million. China will rank among the
top two in the world in terms of the annual number of patents for inven-
tions granted to the domestic applicants, and the quality of patents filed
will further improve. The number of owning patents every one million
people and the number of overseas patent applications filed by Chinese
applicants will double. The proportion of patent applications in indus-
trial enterprises above designated size will reach 8% and the quantity of
owning patent rights will significantly rise. ... The patent transaction
services will be established in major cities of China with annual patent
transaction amounts reaching 100 billion yuan.. .. The patent examin-
er[s] will reach 9,000. ... The talents in the patent service industry will
be greater and the professional categories will be more complete, with
certified patent agents reaching 10,000.24
In addition, SIPO has been very active in developing professional
ties with patent offices from around the world. In 2007, for example, its
officials met their counterparts from the European Patent Office, the
Japanese Patent office, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office to discuss ways to "improv[e]
the efficiency of their examination systems and to harmonize their office
systems."25 These so-called "IP5" discussions, which are ongoing, further
strengthen SIPO's status as "a player in the top tier of patent offices that
will dominate the emerging system of global patent administration."26
While questions remain concerning what a country could do with
two million patents per year and whether such ambitious goals would
8 (2012) ("If gaige kaifang (reform and open) was the dominant policy principle of the
PRC government in the 1980s and 1990s, the recent Hu Jintao government has shifted its
attention to gaige chuangxin (reform and innovation), emphasizing the importance of
innovation and production of the new." (Chinese characters omitted)); Yu, From Pirates
to Partners, supra note 1, at 189-96 (discussing the need to convince Chinese leaders of
the benefits of intellectual property protection).
23. STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
(2011-2020) (2011), translated at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/
SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf.
24. Id. at 4-5.
25. PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND
THEIR CLIENTS 236 (2010).
26. Id. at 233; see also id. (noting that, since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, and
later SIPO, has served as an international searching authority for PCT purposes).
2012]1 531
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result in low patent quality, 27 it is hard not to be amazed by the quick
turnaround China has experienced in the intellectual property area in
less than three decades. Although the country did not have its first pa-
tent law until 1984, it is now on track to have the world's largest volume
of patent filings. When questioned by The New York Times about SIPO's
2015 targets, David Kappos, the director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, could not help but describe those numbers as "mind-
blowing.""
In sum, ample evidence suggests that China is now at the cusp of
crossing over from the less promising side of the intellectual property
divide to the more promising one. 29 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen
when China will hit the proverbial crossover point. It is also unclear
whether China will experience multiple crossover points, which arise as
a result of the country's highly uneven developments across geographical
regions and economic and technological sectors.30
27. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT 12 (2004) ("[T]he rapid increase in the rate of patenting has been accompanied
by a proliferation of patent awards of dubious merit.").
28. Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02unboxed.html (quoting USPTO Direc-
tor David Kappos).
29. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 175 ("[H]istory suggests that China is now
simply following the economic development paths of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan-or even Germany and the United States. It is only a matter of
time before China is converted from a pirating nation to a country that respects intellec-
tual property rights."); see also Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its
Undetermined Future, 1 WIPO J. 1, 10-15 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Global Intellectual
Property Order] (discussing the existence of a "crossover point" where countries consider
it to be in their self-interest to move from a pirating nation to one that strongly respects
intellectual property rights). Noted China scholar Kenneth Lieberthal concurred:
Every current advanced industrial economy went through a phase of develop-
ment characterized by widespread theft of intellectual property. But over time
in each such economy some domestic players developed their own intellectual
property and became sufficiently powerful in the political system that they
moved the system toward more effective IP [intellectual property] protection.
The question is whether a similar process is unfolding in China and whether it
may take hold as Chinese producers move up the technology innovation ladder
with government encouragement and support.
There are clear indicators that China's evolution is following the IP paths
that others have trod.
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, MANAGING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: How TO ACHIEVE CORPORATE
SUCCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 26-27 (2011).
30. See Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 13-14 ("Because of
their complex economic situations, these countries may also have more than one cros-
532 [Vol. 34:525
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B. The U.S. Experience
To better understand how China crosses over from one side of this
divide to the other, and the implications of such a crossover, it is in-
structive to revisit the early development of intellectual property protec-
tion for foreign authors in the United States. Although the United States
offered intellectual property protection to domestic authors since the
founding of the Republic-through state laws initially and federal laws
less than a decade later"-it did not offer similar protection to foreign-
ers. Section 5 of the 1790 Copyright Act, the country's first copyright
law, explicitly stated:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importa-
tion or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any
map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person
not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the ju-
risdiction of the United States."
Although commentators have used the specific needs of a develop-
ing country to justify the early development of U.S. copyright law,33 it is
worth noting that copyright protection to foreign authors was uncom-
mon in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 34  At that
sover point, depending on whether one focuses on a specific geographical region or the
relevant economic sector.").
31. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 338-40 (2003).
The first state to enact copyright legislation was Connecticut. An Act for the Encou-
ragement of Literature and Genius (Jan. 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1783-1906, at 11 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 2d rev. ed. 1906). The first
federal Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
32. Act of May 31, 1790, § 5, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND
ARTISTIC WORKS 859 (10th ed. 2009) ("[It is perhaps not surprising that a have-not
country should permit and even encourage poaching on foreign works, but the same pol-
icy continued even as the nation grew."); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 199 (1968) (noting the need to protect the new nation against
the established trade in England); EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 16 (1980) ("Complete with a piracy
provision it can be viewed as the action of a developing country to protect its burgeoning
culture while exploiting the cultural products of more developed nations."); Thomas
Bender & David Sampliner, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American Literature, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 255, 255 (1997) (arguing that the United States did not afford
intellectual property protection for non-U.S. citizens until it became a major industrial
power).
34. See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 231 (2000) (noting
that "the copyright law of many other countries at that time was not any more protective
of the rights of foreign authors" than the 1790 Copyright Act); Henry G. Henn, The Quest
2012]1 533
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time, many countries "did not ... regard the piracy of foreign authors'
works as unfair or immoral. Some countries, in fact, openly counte-
nanced piracy as contributing to their educational and social needs and
as reducing the prices of books for their citizens."
While the lack of copyright protection to foreign authors in the
1790 Copyright Act hurt all foreign authors, such a lack was particularly
damaging to English authors, 6 who write in the same language as their
American readers. In the post-revolutionary period, English literature
was extensively read throughout the United States.3 ' Between 1800 and
1860, almost half of the bestsellers in the United States were pirated,
mostly from English novels.38 As Sydney Smith rhetorically questioned
in the Edinburgh Review in January 1820, "In the four quarters of the
globe, who reads an American book?"3 1
In the beginning, some English authors were able to secure from
American publishers the so-called "courtesy copyright"-an unwritten
custom of self-restraint whereby each major publishing house refrained
from publishing editions of a foreign work that was already the subject
for International Copyright Protection, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 43 (1953) ("Until a century
ago, the general rule, with a few standout exceptions, was that domestic works were eli-
gible for protection and foreign works were not." (footnote omitted)); Sam Ricketson,
The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 9, 12 (1986) (noting that piracy
activities "had been a long-established feature of European social and cultural life"); Bar-
bara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past, Present, and
Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1051 (1968) ("[1]nternational copyright protection was the
exception rather than the rule.").
35. SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 231; see also STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 25 (1938) ("[I]n Belgium the general be-
lief was that such unauthorized reprints of French books without any payment to the
authors was a perfectly honorable thing.").
36. See S.M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 25 (2d
ed. 1989); see also LADAS, supra note 35, at 26 (noting that "systematic piracy was com-
mitted in the United States of works published in all foreign countries, especially in Eng-
land"); Henn, supra note 34, at 52 ("The United States had been among the most pa-
rochial of nations so far as copyright protection for published works is concerned. For
over a hundred years, this nation not only denied copyright protection to published
works by foreigners,... but appeared to encourage the piracy of such works.").
37. See S. REP. No. 134, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837), reprinted in R.R. BOWKER,
COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW: BEING A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND LAW OF
COPYRIGHT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOOKS 341 (1912) [hereinafter CLAY'S REPORT];
see also SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 231 (noting that very few American authors were ac-
corded serious attention in England in the early nineteenth century).
38. See STEWART, supra note 36, at 25 (quoting JOHN WILLIAM TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF
BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES (1972)).
39. Sydney Smith, Who Reads an American Book?, EDINBURGH REV., Jan. 1820, at 68,
79, quoted in United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908).
[Vol. 34:525534
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of an agreement between its author and another publishing house."
This system not only "protected the first American publisher of a foreign
work from the unfettered copying of his edition, [but also] gave the au-
thor the opportunity of earning some remuneration, even if he were un-
able to prevent the American publication of his work in the first place.""
By virtue of this arrangement, some English authors, such as Charles
Dickens and Anthony Trollope, "received large sums in respect of the
American sales of their works, although they did not enjoy protection
under United States copyright law.""
As competition in the United States heated up and as more publica-
tions came from smaller publishing houses, courtesy copyright became
ineffective." Among the English authors who were greatly concerned
about the lack of copyright protection in the United States were Dickens,
Trollope, and the famous operetta duo of Gilbert and Sullivan.'
In 1838, after the passage of the first International Copyright Act in
Britain," Lord Palmerston, the British prime minister, initiated high-
level contacts with the United States to explore the establishment of a
40. See Ricketson, supra note 34, at 13-14; see also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS
AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY
52 (2001) (discussing courtesy copyrights).
41. Ricketson, supra note 34, at 14.
42. Id.
43. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 52-53 (discussing the emergence of cheap
library editions). As Professor Vaidhyanathan described:
The paper was uniformly cheap and flimsy, the typesetting sloppy, and the
format hard to read. Some of the earlier editions lacked covers to keep their
costs low. But soon the cheap publishers realized that the spine was in many
cases the most attractive-and most visible-part of a book. So by the 1880s,
most of the cheap books libraries appeared in cloth bindings at a slightly higher
price, but with the same cheap paper inside. Needless to say, none of these
publishers were part of the eastern seaboard elite club of publishers who were
led by Henry Holt [a leading publisher at the time]. So none of them con-
formed to the courtesy principle.
Id. at 53.
44. See SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 232-34, 238-39 (discussing Anthony Trollope's
and Gilbert and Sullivan's copyright problems in the United States); Gerhard Joseph,
Charles Dickens, International Copyright, and the Discretionary Silence of Martin Chuzzle-
wit, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523 (1992) (demonstrating how Martin Chuzzlewit
reflects Dickens's distress over the United States' lack of copyright protection to British
authors); see also Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) (concerning the in-
fringement on copyright in The Mikado); Carte v. Duff, 25 F. 183 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885)
(concerning the infringement on copyright in The Mikado); Carte v. Ford, 15 F. 439
(C.C.D. Md. 1883) (concerning the infringement on copyright in Iolanthe).
45. International Copyright Act, 1 & 2 Vict. ch. 59 (1838).
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bilateral copyright treaty.46 This effort failed, to the disappointment of
British authors.4 ' A few years later, Charles Dickens traveled to the
United States to plead for greater protection of British works." That ef-
fort also failed. As Dickens recounted in frustration his unsuccessful trip
to America:
I spoke, as you know, of international copyright, at Boston; and I spoke
of it again at Hartford, My friends were paralysed with wonder at such
audacious daring. The notion that I, a man alone by himself, in America,
should venture to suggest to the Americans that there was one point on
which they were neither just to their own countrymen nor to us, actually
struck the boldest dumb! It is nothing that of all men living I am the
greatest loser by it. It is nothing that I have to claim to speak and be
heard. The wonder is that a breathing man can be found with temerity
enough to suggest to the Americans the possibility of their having done
wrong. I wish you could have seen the faces that I saw, down both sides
of the table at Hartford, when I began to talk about [Sir Walter] Scott. I
wish you could have heard how I gave it out. My blood so boiled as I
thought of the monstrous injustice that I felt as if I were twelve feet high
when I thrust it down their throats.49
Contemporaneous with these external efforts, local support for
greater protection for foreign authors slowly grew in the United States.
In 1837, Senator Henry Clay submitted a report recommending the
enactment of international copyright legislation to extend copyright pro-
tection to British and French authors in the United States.50 The report
included an address and petition by fifty-six prominent British authors,
maintaining that their fellow authors were "exposed to injury in their
reputation and property."51 The petition further stated that British works
were "liable to be mutilated and altered, at the pleasure of [American]
booksellers, or of any other persons who may have an interest in reduc-
ing the price of the works, or in conciliating the supposed principles or
prejudice of purchasers in [the United States]."52
46. See Geo. Haven Putnam, Literary Property: An Historical Sketch, in THE QUESTION
OF COPYRIGHT: A SUMMARY OF THE COPYRIGHT LAwS AT PRESENT IN FORCE IN THE CHIEF
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 66 (1891) [hereinafter QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT].
47. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 51.
48. See Hamish Sandison, The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion: The American Experience, 11 CoLUM.-VLA. J.L. & ARTS 89, 92 (1986).
49. Letter from Charles Dickens to John Foster (Feb. 24, 1842), reprinted in Sandi-
son, supra note 48, at 92.
50. CLAY'S REPORT, supra note 37.
51. Id. 111.
52. Id. 4.
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In addition, the petition appealed to the national interests of Ameri-
can authors, noting the lack of incentives for American publishers to af-
ford local authors a fair remuneration for their labors when these pub-
lishers could obtain foreign works "by unjust appropriation, instead of
by equitable purchase."" At the time of the petition, an American pi-
rated edition was priced at about a quarter of the cost of a legitimate
English edition; the price could go down to even a tenth of that cost."
As Siva Vaidhyanathan recounted: "A London reader who wanted a copy
of Charles Dickens's A Christmas Carol would have to pay the equivalent
of $2.50 in 1843 [while aln American Dickens fan would have to pay
only six cents per copy."5
Finally, the petition warned that the lack of effective protection for
foreign authors might confuse the American public "as to whether the
books presented to them as the works of British authors. . . [were] the
actual and complete productions of the writers whose names they
b[orel."56 The petition also provided an emotional reminder about Sir
Walter Scott, the author of Ivanhoe. Scott was extensively read in the
United States, but died in destitute despite his wild success as an author.
As the petition surmised, Scott would have survived from "the burden of
debts and destructive toils" had he received remuneration from the
American public for his creative endeavors."
Despite the efforts of Senator Clay and other supporters, Congress
did not grant any protection to foreign authors until the 1870s." In-
deed, the attitudes toward protecting foreign authors in the United States
did not dramatically improve until a critical mass of local stakeholders
53. Id. 8.
54. See STEWART, supra note 36, at 25.
55. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 50.
56. CLAY'S REPORT, supra note 37, 1 9.
57. Id. 10.
58. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 51. As Professor Vaidhyanathan re-
counted:
Clay submitted a bill five times between 1837 and 1842. All five attempts
failed. Booksellers and typesetters opposed the bills. Several prominent Amer-
ican authors and political leaders, including Washington Irving, Edward Eve-
rett, and John Quincy Adams, supported the bills. Only two major publishing
houses, Appleton and Putnam, supported Clay's bills.
Id.; see also Ringer, supra note 34, at 1055 ("The Clay bill was reintroduced several times
between 1837 and 1842, but never reached a vote."). Likewise, "unsuccessful attempts to
establish copyright treaty relations with Great Britain were made in 1837, 1863, and
again in 1880-81, foundering each time on the opposition of American publishers who
believed that their financial success depended upon being able to sell cheap reprints of
British books." Sandison, supra note 48, at 92.
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emerged. In the mid-nineteenth century, many American authors, such
as James Fenimore Cooper, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Haw-
thorne, Washington Irving, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Herman Mel-
ville, Edgar Allan Poe, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Henry David Thoreau, and
Walt Whitman, began attracting readership in England and other Euro-
pean countries.5 ' Because most copyright laws were made conditional
on reciprocity in other countries, the lack of protection for foreign au-
thors resulted in American authors being denied similar rights under
foreign law.?
Even worse for these authors, the lack of copyright protection for
foreign authors had created a lot of cheap imports that competed unfair-
ly and directly against works written by local authors."1 Alarmed by the
59. See SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 231.
60. See id. at 232; see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 56 ("Twain started stud-
ying copyright laws during the 1870s when he lost substantial money to Canadian pi-
rates who had recopied his work without offering him compensation."). Max Kempel-
man noted the lack of protection granted to American authors in England:
Longfellow asserted a few years before his death that he had twenty-two pub-
lishers in England and Scotland, but that "only four of them took the slightest
notice of my existence, even so far as to send me a copy of the book." Harriet
Beecher Stowe too is reported to have received no return whatever for her Un-
cle Tom's Cabin, even though it sold more than 1/2 million copies in Great Brit-
ain during its first year alone.
Max Kempelman, The United States and International Copyright, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 413,
413 (1947). Nonetheless, as Professor Samuels pointed out:
It was apparently possible under the existing laws for particularly resourceful
Americans to obtain protection in England by simultaneous publication there,
or for resourceful British citizens to obtain protection in the United States by
simultaneous publication here, but protection apparently required that the au-
thor travel to the other country and reside there at the time of publication. Or
an author might be able to convey the publication rights to a citizen of the oth-
er country before publication; but that rarely led to a very reasonable payment.
SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 232.
61. Max Kempelman explained in detail the plight of American authors:
The practice hurt American authors . . . for their works had to meet the unfair
competition of British books which were cheaper because they were not paid
for. American readers were less inclined to read the novels of Cooper or Haw-
thorne for a dollar when they could buy a novel of Scott or Dickens for a quar-
ter. . . . American men of letters were, therefore, apart from any other consid-
erations, unable to rely on literature for a livelihood. Longfellow and Lowell
were college professors; Hawthorne was in the government service; Emerson
engaged in lecturing. And American readers were weaned on a literature not
their own.
Kempelman, supra note 60, at 413; see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 59 ("While
the first American edition of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer sold by subscription for $2.75
538 [Vol. 34:525
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POWERS
situation, a growing number of American authors and publishers began
to seek "a more level playing field for their editions of American
works."6 2  Some openly discussed how the then-copyright policy had
failed to serve the interests of the American people by keeping foreign
works cheap. As Mark Twain wrote in Century Magazine in 1886:
The statistics of any public library will show that of every hundred books
read by our people, about seventy are novels-and nine-tenths of them
foreign ones. They fill the imagination with an unhealthy fascination
with foreign life, with its dukes and earls and kings, its fuss and feathers,
its graceful immoralities, its sugar-coated injustices and oppressions; and
this fascination breeds a more or less pronounced dissatisfaction with
our country and form of government, and contempt for our republican
commonplaces and simplicities; it also breeds a longing for something
"better" which presently crops out in the diseased shams and imitations
of the ideal foreign spectacle: Hence the "dude."63
Just as local stakeholders began to emerge in the United States, the
conditions and protections of authors also greatly improved across the
Atlantic in the mid-nineteenth century. As Stephen Ladas recounted:
The nineteenth century brought profound changes in the conditions
upon which the rights of authors were based. In the political field, the
liberty of the press, the destruction of the division of social classes, the
dissemination of education, the reinforcement of national unity by the
use of national languages instead of separate dialects; in the social and
economic field, new processes of reproduction of literary and artistic
works, the expansion of the press, the creation of new universities, libra-
ries, museums and expositions, the development of bookselling and the
wider circulation of books, the learning of foreign languages and the
more general travelling of people from one country to another-all these
facts created new conditions for the works of authors and artists. Writ-
ing and the cultivation of the arts came to be a real profession and those
engaged in it expected to be supported by it and no longer by Maecenas
and Royal Courts. As a result authors began to demand a fuller protec-
tion of their rights, and to raise much outcry against the injustice done
them by the pirating of their works in foreign countries."
in 1876, the Canadian pirated editions sold for 50 cents to $1 per copy. Meanwhile,
readers had to choose between buying an emerging American author's new work for at
least 50 cents per copy, or Sir Walter Scott's Ivanhoe for 10 to 15 cents."); Ringer, supra
note 34, at 127 ("By protecting only works of American authors, the new law sanctioned
the unrestrained reprinting of popular English writers, to the disastrous competitive dis-
advantage of the very indigenous American literature it was pledged to encourage.").
62. SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 235.
63. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 61 (quoting Mark Twain).
64. LADAS, supra note 35, at 23-24.
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In 1886, the major European powers and a few other like-minded
countries succeeded in establishing the Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic WorkS65 (Berne Convention). Although the
United States only participated in the negotiation conference as an ob-
server6 6 and did not join the Convention until more than a century lat-
er,67 Congress, in the face of strong pressure from American authors and
some local publishers, actively considered proposals to provide reciproc-
al copyright protection to foreign authors within the United States. 8
Meanwhile, countries in the American continents also explored the pos-
sibility of creating Pan-American copyright conventions similar to what
European countries established in Berne.69
In 1891, the United States Congress finally enacted the Internation-
al Copyright Act of March 3, 1891.70 Under what was commonly re-
ferred to as the Chace Act 7 foreign authors received copyright protec-
tion when the President of the United States proclaimed that their home
country provided American citizens with "the benefit of copyright on
substantially the same basis as its own citizens" or that such a country
was a party to an international agreement that provided reciprocal copy-
right protection to its members and to which "the United States may, at
its pleasure, become a party."72 By offering protection to foreign authors
65. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971). The text of the original Berne
Convention is reprinted in LADAS, supra note 35, at 1123-34.
66. Although the United States did not sign the original Berne Convention, its dele-
gate, Boyd Winchester, held out the promise of accession if the circumstances should
become appropriate:
Whilst not prepared to join the proposed Convention as a full Signatory, the
United States does not thereby wish to be understood as opposing the measure
in any way, but on the contrary, desires to reserve without prejudice the privi-
lege of future accession to the Convention, should it become expedient and
practicable to do so . . . . This position and attitude of the United States is one
of expectancy and reserve.
LADAS, supra note 35, at 29-30 (quoting Winchester).
67. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Berne Convention
entered into force in the United States on March 1, 1989.
68. See LADAS, supra note 35, at 27.
69. See Ringer, supra note 34, at 1060.
70. International Copyright Act of March 3, 1891 (Chace Act), Ch. 565, 26 Stat.
1106.
71. The statute's longer name is Chace-Breckinridge-Adams-Simonds-Platt Copy-
right Act of 1891. Analysis of the Provisions of the Copyright Law of 1891, in QUESTION OF
COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, at 176.
72. Section 13 of the Chace Act provides:
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(in addition to local authors), the United States finally crossed over from
the unpromising side of the intellectual property divide to the more
promising one."
Today, the United States is no longer the notorious pirate that it
was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Rather, it has actively
championed the cause for greater protection of copyrighted works
throughout the world. It has also become one of the predominant intel-
lectual property powers pushing for stronger levels of protection and en-
forcement around the world." Not only was the United States instru-
mental in establishing the TRIPS Agreement," it has also applied
continual pressure to induce developing countries to reform their intel-
lectual property systems. Of great recent concern to the international
community is the United States' active push for the establishment of bi-
lateral, plurilateral, and regional trade, investment, and intellectual
That this act shall apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation when
such foreign state or nation permits to citizens of the United States of America
the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own citizens; or
when such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement
which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of
which agreement the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party to such
agreement.
Chace Act § 5. "This system [of Presidential proclamations] has proved cumbersome
and ineffective in comparison with the simplicity, certainty, and other advantages offered
by multilateral arrangements." Ringer, supra note 34, at 1058.
73. It is worth noting that the United States, at that time, already provided strong
protection to local authors. The United States' crossover experience was therefore not
identical to that of China. Nevertheless, one could make a strong argument that discri-
minating against foreign authors is far worse than not offering adequate protection to all
types of author-both local and foreign. While the former favors the discriminating
country, the latter involves the sacrifice of local authors. The latter therefore incurs
greater political costs on the part of the country's leadership.
74. For an interesting discussion of why the United States underwent a 180-degree
change in its approach toward intellectual property protection, see J. Thomas McCarthy,
Intellectual Property-America's Overlooked Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 809 (1995).
75. For excellent discussions of the TRIPS negotiations, see generally DANIEL
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 3-26 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing the origins and development of the TRIPS Agreement); JAYASHREE WATAL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11-47 (2001)
(recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-79 (2006) (examining four differ-
ent accounts of the origins of the TRIPS Agreement).
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property agreements, including the highly controversial ACTA" and the
equally problematic Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)."
If experiences from countries like the United States-and, for that
matter, Germany, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea-can be genera-
lized, China will experience a crossover in the near future. Indeed, one
can already observe many similarities between the path taken by the
United States in the nineteenth century and the path that the major de-
veloping countries are now taking. While the United States went
through three different stages of development-"from pirate to holdout
to enforcer""-many developing countries have already experienced the
first two stages.7 9 Thus, it is only a matter of time before China and oth-
76. For the Author's criticisms of ACTA, see generally Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Pol-
itics, supra note 3; Yu, What Enforcement?, supra note 3; Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note
3.
77. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited June 22, 2012) (providing up-to-date information
about TPP). See generally Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New
Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011) (discuss-
ing TPP); Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 4 (explaining why TPP is likely to be more dan-
gerous than ACTA from a public interest standpoint).
78. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONoMy 34 (2d
ed. 2006); see also SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 230 ("The role of the United States in the
international copyright community has gone from that of outlaws to outsiders to 'stran-
gers at the feast' to leading members of the club.").
79. As I wrote earlier:
When one examines the development paths of many former less-developed
countries, one could identify three distinct stages of development: (1) isolation;
(2) emergence; and (3) crossover. The first stage began with the establishment
of the international intellectual property regime. For most countries, this stage
ended when countries declared independence and entered into relations with
other countries on their own volition. The isolation stage lasted a little longer
for those who relied on import substitution and similar strategies, such as those
in the Communist bloc and South America. Unless there is a major setback to
the international legal order, such as a movement to abandon existing interna-
tional treaties, this stage is over for virtually all countries today.
The second stage occurred when less-developed countries pushed for the es-
tablishment of the old development agenda in the 1960s and early 1970s, such
as the revision of the Paris and Berne Conventions, the transformation of WIPO
[World Intellectual Property Organization] into a specialised agency of the
United Nations, and the establishment of the New International Economic Or-
der. Except for WIPO's inclusion in the United Nations, most of these efforts
ended with failure, due in no small part to the internal economic crises in these
countries, the successful divide-and-conquer strategies deployed by the United
States and other developed countries, and the successful launch of the [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]/WTO negotiations. The ongoing develop-
ment agendas also fit within this stage and could be considered a continuation
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er latecomers in the developing world reach a crossover point where
stronger protection will be in their self-interests."
In sum, China will likely provide some good news to intellectual
property rights holders. After fighting hard for more than two decades
and suffering considerable financial losses from piracy and counterfeit-
ing, these rights holders and their supportive governments will finally
begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Nevertheless, as the next
Part. shows, the rapid and dramatic improvements in the intellectual
property arena may bring some unintended consequences. The United
States and its intellectual property industries may therefore be in for a
rude awakening. While greater protection and enforcement will certain-
ly provide some benefits, such improvements will also create an intellec-
tual property power against which the United States may not be interest-
ed in competing.
11. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Although the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights in China is important, competition is not only about such protec-
tion and enforcement."1 In fact, as the British Commission on Intellec-
tual Property Rights rightly recognized, intellectual property rights
of past pro-development efforts. At this point, however, it is premature to eva-
luate the success of these recent efforts.
The last stage is where a less-developed country crosses over from a pirating
nation to one that shows a strong respect for intellectual property rights. This
stage is set to begin for some high-income developing countries, such as Brazil,
China and India. It unfortunately will begin much later for low-income devel-
oping and least-developed countries. Indeed, for countries with very low imita-
tive capacity or an insufficiently developed market, sufficient empirical evi-
dence has suggested that stronger intellectual property protection may not be
in the best interest of these countries.
Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
80. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34
AM.J.L. & MED. 345, 391 (2008); Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 202.
81. As Jerome Reichman observed:
[I]ntellectual property rights are but one component of overall economic
growth; that different states have different factor endowments; and that in
many countries, especially those at an early stage of development, a sound agri-
cultural policy or a sound pro-competitive industrial policy with a supportive
political and legal infrastructure are more likely to stimulate economic growth
than intellectual property laws.
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing
Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOus. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2009) [hereinafter Reichman,
Twenty-First Century].
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should be regarded "as instruments of public policy which confer eco-
nomic privileges on individuals or institutions solely for the purposes of
contributing to the greater public good."8 Because the conferred privi-
leges should be "a means to an end, not an end in itself,"83 it is important
for policymakers to focus on the broader picture of innovation and com-
petition, as opposed to a narrower picture of intellectual property pro-
tection and enforcement. Focusing on this broader picture, this Part
discusses three potential unintended consequences caused by rapid and
dramatic improvements in the Chinese intellectual property system: (1)
an intellectual property litigation explosion in China; (2) the United
States' reduced competitive edge over China; and (3) the barriers to fu-
ture intellectual property reform in the United States.
A. Litigation Blowback
For more than two decades, commentators have criticized China for
its lack of respect for the rule of law and inadequately developed legal
system." Even though China has yet to respect the rule of law the same
way as Western democracies, its legal system has greatly improved, es-
pecially after its accession to the WTO." Although much room for im-
provement still exists, and although most rights holders would rather see
more litigation than less at this point in time, policymakers should begin
thinking about what will happen if the volume of litigation continues to
increase in China. After all, while the United States has strong respect
82. COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 6 (2002) (hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT]. Simi-
larly, Marco Ricolfi stated:
A closer reading of TRIPs ... shows that IP protection and enforcement are
seen as means rather than ends in themselves both because the larger ends en-
compass freedom of trade . . . and because the international community is
committed to taking into account other non-trade and non-IP factors while
shaping IP protection.
Marco Ricolfi, Is There an Antitrust Antidote Against IP Overprotection Within TRIPs?, 10
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305, 326 (2006).
83. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 82, at 6.
84. For discussions of rule-of-law developments in China, see generally JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peeren-
boom ed., 2009); RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW
(2002); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000).
85. See Shi Guangsheng, Introduction: Working Together for a Brighter Future Based
on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 15, 15 (Henry Gao & Donald
Lewis eds., 2005) ("After joining the WTO, China first and foremost sorted out over
2,300 laws and regulations nationwide.").
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for the rule of law, commentators have heavily criticized the country for
its litigiousness.8 6
Moreover, when things happen in China, they tend to happen on a
gigantic scale. This is true regardless of piracy and counterfeiting or in-
tellectual property litigation. If insufficient safeguards are built into the
legal system to prevent frivolous lawsuits and abuse of rights, the greater
use of the legal system could eventually backfire on foreign rights hold-
ers. For firms that manufacture all their goods in China, litigation-
related disruption could be quite damaging. In fact, an injunction in
China could easily result in the shutting down of all the production of a
defendant firm.
In an earlier work, I discussed how the challenge of Pfizer's patent
in sildenafil citrate, a key ingredient of Viagra, before SIPO in July 2003
portended an emerging trend of growing litigiousness among Chinese
firms. Taking the opposite perspective, some commentators quickly
classified this challenge as yet another attempt to pirate American intel-
lectual property rights. As a former director of policy planning at the
USTR wrote:
Faced with rising global pressure to crack down on patent infringement,
Beijing may be in the process of redefining patent criteria effectively to
safeguard Chinese drug-makers from accusations of illegal infringe-
ments. The removal of patents on Viagra or Avandia would offer Chi-
nese companies free rein to manufacture homegrown copycat drugs
without fear of prosecution. If these cases continue in their current di-
rection, China may in the process violate its obligations to the WTO.
For the global research pharmaceutical industry, the ruling carries
the significant threat of a Chinese government tacitly supporting the
production of counterfeit drugs by domestic Chinese companies. For
China's trading partners worldwide, the ruling demonstrates China's
somewhat cautious embrace of the WTO's rules-based system, which it
joined in 2002.89
86. For discussions of litigiousness in American society, see generally JETHRO K.
LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
87. See Wang Xiang, Partner, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Remarks at the
2012 Asia Law Society Symposium, University of Michigan Law School (Mar. 24, 2012).
88. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 984-91 (discussing the chal-
lenge of Pfizer's patent in sildenafil citrate before SIPO).
89. Naotaka Matsukata, China's Counterfeit Commitment to Patents, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2004, at 17; see also China's Viagra Heist, WALL ST.J., July 12, 2004, at A16 ("The deci-
sion in favor of a group of Chinese pharmaceutical companies who had petitioned the
SIPO demonstrates a troubling pattern. Although it is under international pressure to
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While it is not hard to understand the views expressed by those con-
cerned about the SIPO challenge, especially Pfizer and other similarly
situated foreign firms, their views overlooked the fact that the local chal-
lengers were actually relying on the legal process to invalidate the patent
granted by SIPO.
To be certain, the outcome was unfavorable to Pfizer (and likely
many other foreign rights holders). One could also debate about the ap-
propriate legal basis for reviews granted by SIPO. Nevertheless, it is
hard to ignore the fact that the use of the SIPO process to invalidate a
patent was exactly what intellectual property rights holders should ex-
pect in a country making a transition to become more respectful of intel-
lectual property rights. As Doug Clark, a noted intellectual property at-
torney formerly from Lovells, declared, "[Als long as people are
interested in dealing with commercial disputes through court, it is a sign
that a country is developing a proper legal system rather than ignoring
it." 90
A decade ago, local firms would simply ignore the law and manu-
facture counterfeit products. Many still do today. This time, however,
local firms went to SIPO first, asking for the invalidation of Pfizer's pa-
tent for its failure to satisfy the novelty requirement.1 That was indeed
an improvement.
If this trend continues and accelerates, however, it may eventually
lead to an unhealthy explosion of intellectual property challenges and
litigation. Consider the patent area, for example. While some chal-
lenges will undoubtedly be mounted as a result of the low or inconsis-
respect intellectual property rights, China is acceding to the demands of its own compa-
nies for patent-nullification."); Dudley Schiler, Pfizer Clarifies China's Reversal of Viagra
Patent, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 6, 2004, at 24 (maintaining that "China's decision to
overturn the Viagra patent ... does indeed break new and unsettling legal
ground ... [and] sends a very disturbing message to all who are concerned about Chi-
na's commitment to intellectual property right").
90. Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 986 n.394 (quoting Pfizer v. Chi-
na, RED HERRING, Aug. 26, 2004).
91. It is worth noting that the Viagra patent has also been invalidated in the United
Kingdom and South America as well as by the European Patent Office. See, e.g., Tony
Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, FIN. TIMES (Asia), July 21, 2004, at 10 (providing a
brief history of the development of Viagra and discussing the revocation of the Viagra
patent in the United Kingdom and by the European Patent Office); Andy Ho, The Hoopla
Over Viagra Patenting in China, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 14, 2004, at 16 (reporting the
invalidation of the Viagra patent in the United Kingdom, Colombia, and Venezuela as
well as by the European Patent Office); Phelim Kyne et al., China Voids Pfizer's Viagra
Patent, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2004, at A3 (reporting that "in 2001, the patent was disal-
lowed in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela over a different issue").
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tent quality of Chinese patents,92 other litigants may seek to test the
boundaries of the intellectual property system. Some may even abuse
the system, hoping to obtain opportunistic gains. Eventually, the in-
creased litigation in China may make it very costly for foreign rights
holders or new local firms to enter the market. In fact, the growing vo-
lume of lawsuits in the country has already led some commentators to
"wonder whether China is becoming a place where business disputes are
resolved by rule of law or whether it is simply adopting a 'bad' habit of
the west."93
At the macro-level, an explosion of intellectual property litigation in
China can easily become a trade barrier. This is particularly true when
courts begin to grant high damage awards against foreign firms. In the
widely-reported 2006 case of Chint v. Schneider Electric, for example, the
Wenzhou Intermediate People's Court awarded the Chinese plaintiff
damages of 330 million RMB (about $48 million) for infringement on a
utility model patent." That case provided the largest damage award ever
granted for patent infringement in China. Although the case was even-
tually settled, it has caught considerable attention from foreign policy-
makers, firms, and commentators, due in part to the award's unprece-
dented size and the fact that Schneider Electric was a foreign firm.
Today, many intellectual property rights holders in China have al-
ready actively incorporated litigation into their business strategies.
92. See generally Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possi-
ble Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478 (2012) (questioning the quality of
Chinese patents and offering suggestions for reform).
93. Chen, supra note 91.
94. For discussions of Chint v. Schneider Electric, see generally Wayne C. Jaeschke,
Lu Zhun & Paul Crawford, Comparison of Chinese and U.S. Patent Reform Legislation:
Which, If Either, Got It Right?, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 567, 576 (2012);
Symposium, Chinese Intellectual Property Judges Panel, 15 SMU Sa. & TECH. L. REV. 61,
64-66 (2011).
95. See Jameson Berkow, Patent Dragon Awakes, FIN. POST (Nov. 7, 2011, 6:39 PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/11/07/patent-dragon-awakes/. As Mike Elmer, a
senior counsel at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, explained:
Historically, when we represented a Chinese company at Finnegan it was al-
most always as a defendant . . . . But now, the Chinese are starting to develop
their own portfolios, and these are defensive portfolios so if you get sued you
can turn around and sue somebody else. Ultimately, Itheiri game plan will be-
come an offensive one.
Id. (quoting Elmer) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chen, supra note 91
("Intellectual property disputes have ... mushroomed. Chinese companies are incorpo-
rating litigation into their business strategy. Over 9,000 lawsuits were filed in China in
2003.").
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Commentators have also noted that China now has the world's largest
volume of intellectual property litigation.9 As Chinese firms continue to
buy intellectual property assets and foreign firms holding those assets,97
Chinese firms could initiate intellectual property litigation in not only
China, but also throughout the world. As a result, an intellectual prop-
erty litigation explosion in China could easily spread to other parts of
the world.
To some extent, one could tie the growing volume of Chinese intel-
lectual property lawsuits to the ongoing concern about patent trolls in
the United States." If the patent troll problem takes place in China, the
scale of the problem is likely to be very significant. In fact, some com-
mentators have already noted the difference between patent trolls in the
United States and those found in China. As Chris Bailey, Rouse's deputy
China country manager, observed, the term "patent cockroaches" better
describes the smaller but more numerous patent trolls in China:
96. As Xuan-Thao Nguyen documented:
In 2005, there were 12,159 patent, copyright, and trademark cases filed in the
United States, compared to 10,825 cases in China. In 2006, the United States
saw 11,486 cases, while China witnessed 11,436 intellectual property cases.
The trend continues, as demonstrated by the fact that the number of intellec-
tual property cases filed in 2007 for the United States totaled 10,761, whereas
China's was 15,159.
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China's Intellectual
Property Regime, 55 ST. Louis L.J. 773, 775 (2011); see also Berkow, supra note 95 ("'In
Canada, you have maybe 60 patent infringement cases filed per year, maybe 80, and in
the United States there are 3,000. .. . China now has more than 3,000 ... probably clos-
er to 4,000 now."' (quoting Mike Elmer, Senior Counsel, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
Garrett & Dunner, LLP)); Doug Tsuruoka, Intellectual Property in China, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Mar. 29, 2010, at Al (stating that "Chinese courts heard more than 4,000 new
cases in 2008 vs. 2,800 for the U.S. and 200 for Japan" and reporting the description by
Tony Chen, a partner in the Shanghai office of Jones Day, of China as "No. 1 in terms of
patent infringement lawsuits between private parties").
97. See SHAUN REIN, THE END OF CHEAP CHINA: ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TRENDS THAT
WILL DISRUPT THE WORLD 167 (2012) ("Chinese firms tend to acquire companies to buy
brands for introduction into China, to cut the time needed for building brands, and to
import technological know-how and management expertise."); ZENG & WILLIAMSON, Su-
pra note 6, at 139-40 ("[T]he Chinese are strategically acquiring companies that will
help them overcome the impediments to winning market share in industries where cost
innovation is difficult to exploit complementary local knowledge or technology"); id. at
140 (stating that China's SGSB Group "acquired a strong brand, a wealth of customer re-
lationships, and advance technology" through the acquisition of Duerkopp Adler, the
German producer of industrial sewing machines); see also PETER NOLAN, IS CHINA BUYING
THE WORLD? (2012) (critically examining the claim that "China is buying the world").
98. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 2008-10 (2007) (discussing patent trolls).
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China doesn't have patent trolls, it has patent cockroaches. That's
not my name, but it is one that I've heard over here before. It's the per-
fect expression, really. It describes an individual inventor or company
that has a cheap utility model patent, probably invalid, which in many
cases was probably invented during their time in another company.
They then assert this against, ideally, a foreign company or big corpora-
tion. It should be remembered that it has cost them very little to attain
this patent or to file, so even a damages award that is just a few thousand
dollars is worth it for them, as the cost of litigation is also very low.99
B. New Competitive Edge
The TRIPS Agreement has been widely recognized as a strategic tool
deployed by the United States, members of the European Communities,
Japan, and other developed countries to protect their important interests
in intellectual property-based goods and services. As Ha-joon Chang
pointed out in his attractively titled book, the rules in the existing inter-
national trading system have enabled developed countries to "kick away
the ladder" needed by developing countries to catch up economically
and technologically. 00 Even today, many U.S. policymakers and firms
subscribe to the view that strengthening intellectual property protection
will be critically important to the success of those firms and the Ameri-
can economy.
While this proposition has been true for most of the past two dec-
ades, it has become increasingly questionable today. After all, intellec-
tual property protection has always been about striking an appropriate
balance. As Judge Alex Kozinski warned us in his famous dissent in
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., "Overprotecting intellectual
property is as harmful as underprotecting it."'o' Likewise, Josh Lerner
wrote in a special issue of The WIPO Journal: "Almost all economists
would agree that some intellectual property protection is better than no
99. NPEs, Chinese Style, IAM MAG. BLOG, http://www.iam-
magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=6c5ael 24-8052-40e3-873d-805cbb5dOel 7 (last visited
June 22, 2012) (quoting Chris Bailey, Rouse's deputy China country manager).
100. HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (2002) (tracing the phrase to FREIDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL
SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 39 (Sampson Lloyd trans., 1885)).
101. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Ko-
zinski, J., dissenting).
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intellectual property protection at all. But this does not mean that very
strong protection is better than a more moderate level of protection. "102
To some extent, the push for China to strengthen intellectual prop-
erty protection has resulted in the slow and paradoxical erosion of the
United States' competitive position. 03  This point sounds counterintui-
tive, but it actually makes a lot of sense. From a long-term competition
standpoint, greater intellectual property protection will make China
more innovative and therefore more competitive. Such increased com-
petitiveness will slowly erode the competitive advantage the United
102. Josh Lerner, The Patent System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPOJ. 28, 32 (2010); see
also Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENv. U. L. REv. 13, 17
(2006) ("More [copyright protection] is not always better, and small can be beautiful.").
103. As I wrote earlier:
It is no coincidence that many research and development (R & D) intensive in-
dustries remain located in the United States-and for that matter, other coun-
tries with a strong intellectual property system. It is also worth noting that
many researchers and highly educated people choose to stay in the country. To
some extent, weaker intellectual property protection abroad may have helped
keep US jobs in the R & D intensive industries, especially amid the current
global economic crisis. Stronger intellectual property protection and enforce-
ment in China, therefore, is a double-edged sword: it can help and hurt the US
economy at the same time.
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 12-13 (2010). Similar-
ly, Jerome Reichman noted:
[High standards of protection that seem to lock in economic advantages today
can turn against those who promoted them tomorrow. When market power
shifts and states having newly acquired economic capabilities arrive on domes-
tic markets demanding respect for their internationally guaranteed proprietary
rights, today's maximalists could well find themselves hoisted on their own pe-
tards.
J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a
GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 889 (1989); see also Amy Kapczynski,
Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's Phar-
maceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1584 (2009) ("TRIPS may ... have perverse im-
plications for the multinational firms that advocated for it. Although they aimed to push
Indian competitors out of the low-value Indian market, they may have also pushed In-
dian companies into the U.S. and EU markets on which their profits much more substan-
tially rely."); Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Asia: Implica-
tions for Australia, 37 AUSTRALIAN ECON. PAPERS 346, 358 (1998) ("One problem
particularly facing small, open economies that already have comprehensive [intellectual
property rights] in place is that as Asian systems become more protective their markets
become relatively more attractive to foreign investors and licensors."); Reichman, Twen-
ty-First Century, supra note 81, at 1119 ("[Als often happens in international law, efforts
to rig a regime for short-term advantages may turn out, in the medium- and long-term,
to boomerang against those who pressed hardest for its adoption.").
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States has traditionally enjoyed as a result of its much higher intellectual
property standards.
In fact, if all countries offer the same level of intellectual property
protection and enforcement, other location factors will be determinative.
These factors may include the size and growth of the market, and the
costs of labor," transportation, and raw materials.10 As China offers
stronger intellectual property protection, more American and multina-
tional firms may consider relocating to China to take advantage of its
lower production costs and considerable market potential. 10 More
technology will be transferred as a result, and more U.S. jobs-a key fo-
cus of the present administration-will be outsourced."
It is no coincidence that many research and development (R & D)
intensive industries remain located in the United States-and for that
matter, other countries with a strong intellectual property system. It is
also worth noting that many researchers and highly educated individuals
chose to stay in the country, due in large part to the high remuneration
for their creative and inventive activities.' In a perverse way, weaker
104. See REED E. HUNDT, IN CHINA'S SHADOW: THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 23 (2007) ("[Tlheir sheer numerosity means that many Chinese en-
trepreneurs can hire new employees at low wages for the indefinite future.").
105. Examples of other location factors include local demand patterns, distance from
markets, access to natural resources, trade protection, education and training of the local
workforce, the condition of the financial sector, the health of the legal system, and the
transparency of governmental procedures. See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field:
Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV.
249, 258-59 (2003); Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encour-
aging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109,
123 (1998).
106. See Peter K. Yu, Trade Barriers Won't Contain China's Cars, DETROIT NEWS, Oct.
25, 2007, at 15A; Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 14 ("[1]f every-
thing (including intellectual property standards) is the same, what would prevent multi-
national corporations from relocating their operations to countries that have drastically
lower production, labour and distribution costs?").
107. Some commentators, however, have pointed out that outsourcing to China will
be less attractive in the future, due to the increased costs of living (and therefore costs of
production). See REIN, supra note 97, at xiii ("Companies can no longer manufacture
cheaply in China, and may need to rethink their strategies and shift manufacturing to
lower-cost production centers like Vietnam or Indonesia-or even back to the United
States in some cases."). But see id. at 26 (recounting the view of the president of a
Shanghai furniture factory that "Chinese workers overall have more experienced line
managers, and more drive and ability to produce more sophisticated products").
108. See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
156 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 166, 173-76 (1994).
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intellectual property protection abroad may have helped keep U.S. jobs
in the R & D intensive industries, especially amid the current global
economic crisis. Stronger intellectual property protection and enforce-
ment in China, therefore, is a double-edged sword: it can help and hurt
the U.S. economy at the same time.
When I advance in conferences the argument that strengthening in-
tellectual property protection in China could result in more outsourcing
or offshoringo' and thereby greater reduction of U.S. jobs, that argument
often invites responses claiming that the United States should engage in
a race to the top, not a race to the bottom. While aspiring to engage in a
race to the top is correct, positive, and admirable, today's major U.S.
firms-or more correctly, multinational corporations-seem to be fo-
cusing more on their bottom line than on helping the country to engage
in a race to the top. What is good for General Motors may not be good
for America. In fact, if firms continue to outsource or offshore in an ef-
fort to widen the profit margin, helping China strengthen intellectual
property protection and enforcement will certainly give the country a
new competitive edge, assuming China can continue to maintain, on bal-
ance, its existing comparative advantages."o
Even more problematic for U.S. policymakers, multinational firms
have now been actively investing in R & D facilities in China."' Despite
109. As Thomas Friedman explained:
Offshoring ... is different from outsourcing. Outsourcing means taking some
specific, but limited, function that your company was doing in-house-such as
research, call centers, or accounts receivable-and having another company
perform that exact same function for you and then reintegrating their work
back into your overall operation. Offshoring, by contrast, is when a company
takes one of its factories that it is operating in Canton, Ohio, and moves the
whole factory offshore to Canton, China. There, it produces the very same
product in the very same way, only with cheaper labor, lower taxes, subsidized
energy, and lower health-care costs.
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
114-15 (2005).
110. See ODED SHENKAR, COPYCATS: How SMART COMPANIES USE IMITATION To GAIN A
STRATEGIC EDGE 63 (2010) ("Globalization and outsourcing increase the number and di-
versity of competitors while at the same time knowledge is becoming more codified and
transferable."); ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 46 ("The rise of outsourcing in the
global economy has clearly been an important factor in allowing Chinese companies to
unlock the door to the global market at an early stage in their development."). Although
the costs of living (and production) will certainly increase, see REIN, supra note 97, at
xiii, the Chinese market still has not reached its full potential. If this market continues
to grow, the increase in market size may offset some of the location disadvantages
brought about by increasing production costs.
111. As Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson wrote:
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their repeated complaints about inadequate and ineffective intellectual
property protection in China, these firms have also increased their ef-
forts to secure intellectual property rights in that country."' According
to the World Bank, the volume of patent and trademark applications in
2010 by nonresidents amounted to 98,1111" and 67,838, respectively."
These figures stand in sharp contrast to 22,478 and 39,633 in Australia,
a country clearly more respectful of intellectual property rights." 5 It is
therefore no surprise that Reed Hundt, the former chairman of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, includes the following warning in
his book In China's Shadow:
If the United States offshores technology leadership along with jobs and
investment capital, the firms left behind will not necessarily find big
winners around which to cluster. They will become more tentative.
[Since 1993], Motorola has built sixteen R&D centers with more than eighteen
hundred people. In 1999, Motorola set up its China Research Institute in Bei-
jing, which is among the largest facilities of its type in China, and also a world-
class center within Motorola. Between 1985 and 2003, Motorola has applied
for 2,305 patents, making it among the biggest patent applicants in China....
Recognizing that it needs to leverage Chinese advantages at every stage of
the value chain in order to strengthen its global competitiveness, Korea's LG
group has gone even further, moving key R&D to China. In 2005 LG hired
two thousand engineers and scientists into its Chinese R&D center, making it
LG's largest R&D site outside Korea. LG has submitted more worldwide patent
applications based on research conducted in China than any other company,
with the exception for Huawei. By placing such emphasis on China-based
R&D, LG is tapping into the secrets of how to deliver high technology at low
cost to strengthen and differentiate its completive position against rivals such
as Sony, Matsushita, and its archrival Samsung.
ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 178. As they continued:
[Since the mid-1990s, Intel] has built five plants in China, all using the latest
technologies. To tap into China's distinctive technological developments, Intel
Capital has invested in almost fifty companies in China and in 2005 it set up a
$200 million Intel Capital China Technology Fund to take shares in promising
technologies emerging there.
Id. at 181.
112. See HUNDT, supra note 104, at 49-50 ("American firms fear theft of intellectual
property in China. Nonetheless, they routinely file for copyrights, trademarks, and pa-
tents in many countries."); ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 178 (describing the ac-
tive filing of patent applications in China by Motorola and LG).
113. Patent Applications, Nonresident, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.PAT.NRES (last visited May 11, 2012).
114. Trademark Applications, Direct Nonresident, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.TMK.NRES (last visited May 11, 2012).
115. Patent Applications, Nonresident, supra note 113; Trademark Applications, Direct
Nonresident, supra note 114.
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They may not keep pace with Chinese technology development, or even
obtain equally good service from Chinese technology sellers, as when
California taught American business how to obtain the productivity
gains of the 1990s. The left-behind will struggle with the airline sche-
dules to China and the language and mores of the Chinese. They may
slow the pace of the investment and lose completive advantage in mar-
kets where foreigners can compete against them.' 16
C. Point of No Reversal
Macroeconomic structures constantly change. In the near future,
the economic structure of the United States-and for that matter, mem-
bers of the European Union, Japan, or other existing developed coun-
tries-could depend more on innovation than existing forms of intellec-
tual property rights. If firms like Apple, Google, and Facebook-as
opposed to, say, the U.S. film and pharmaceutical industries-are driv-
ing the U.S. economy in the future, one has to wonder how much the ex-
isting international intellectual property system will still benefit the
United States."
This point indeed came up during the discussion of ACTA. One
major charge against this flawed and controversial plurilateral agreement
is that, by locking in the existing high standards, the agreement may fo-
reclose the opportunity for Congress to revise laws in the near future.
While Congress can always ratchet up intellectual property standards,
using the ACTA standards as the floor, the Agreement may prevent Con-
gress from ratcheting down those high standards.
Exemplifying this concern was the question Senator Ron Wyden
raised in his letter to the USTR. ' In that letter, he questioned whether
ACTA would lock the United States into the existing model under the
116. HUNDT, supra note 104, at 50 (footnote omitted).
117. As Christopher May wrote:
lA]s the balance of technical leadership starts to move, perhaps accelerated by
the impact of the recession on research and innovation in the most-developed
countries (the US, Europe, and Japan), it is not clear that those states that pre-
viously argued for robust protection of [intellectual property rights] will neces-
sarily find themselves so advantaged by the current settlement. If the TRIPs
agreement and the work of WIPO has largely in the past privileged the interests
and benefits of the technological leaders in the global economy, what happens
when this leadership starts to shift?
Christopher May, Afterword to IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 170, 172 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009).
118. See Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate, to Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Rep. (Jan. 6,
2010).
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act"' (DMCA). In response to his ques-
tion, Ronald Kirk, the United States Trade Representative, wrote: "We
envision that the provisions of the DMCA would be relevant to U.S.
compliance with future ACTA obligations. However, we are aware of
concerns about retaining flexibility to legislate in the future in this field,
and have written our proposals with those concerns in mind."l20
Ambassador Kirk's response is particularly telling, because it reveals
the potential challenge in locking all the ACTA negotiating parties into
the current high standards for intellectual property protection and en-
forcement while at the same time retaining flexibility and autonomy to
allow each country to undertake future legislative reform that may lower
the protection or create additional limitations and exceptions.12' That
challenge becomes even more important considering that limitations and
exceptions have always been an integral part of the U.S. intellectual
property system.122 They arguably have helped the United States achieve
119. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
120. Letter from Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Rep., to Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate (Jan. 28,
2010).
121. In fact, this concern is not only limited to ACTA. It has been raised during the
negotiation of other bilateral and regional free trade agreements. As Senators Patrick
Leahy and Arlen Specter reminded the USTR, "ACTA, if not drafted with sufficient flex-
ibility, could limit Congress's ability to make appropriate refinements to intellectual
property law in the future"-an institutional concern raised by the Senators earlier in
relation to the implementation of the United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement. Letter
from Patrick Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary & Arlen Specter,
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade
Rep. (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/senate-acta-letter-
20081002.pdf; accord JANICE T. PILCH, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT 3
(Library Copyright Alliance, Issue Brief, 2009), http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/
bm-doc/_issuebriefactafinalrev102609.pdf ("Intellectual property law is dynamic, con-
stantly being shaped by social and economic needs and technological advances. A rigid
plurilateral system of enforcement could hinder the flexibility of the U.S., as well as other
nations, to adapt their intellectual property laws to future needs and scenarios."); Eddan
Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Know-
ledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Cre-
ation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT'L L.
ONLINE 24, 34 (1999) ("[Ulsing an international agreement to lock in a particular inter-
pretation of issues that are in dispute in U.S. courts precludes future policy options by
creating foreign obligation barriers to domestic legislative reform.").
122. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996) (noting that exceptions and limitations are "just
as important as the grant of the right itself'); see also P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L.
OKEDIJl, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND ExCEPTIONS TO
COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/
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phenomenal success in developing innovative start-ups, including those
in Silicon Valley and Route 128.123
Thus, as the structure of the U.S. economy continues to evolve, the
country may need more flexibility and autonomy to adjust the levels of
intellectual property protection to those demanded by the local economy
and innovative start-ups. As these demands are increasingly made, the
greater intellectual property protection in China and other developing
countries pushed by the United States could ultimately come back to
haunt U.S. policymakers. Indeed, the exceedingly high protective stan-
dards adopted across the world and the related international commit-
ments could make it difficult for the United States to roll back some of
its existing protections.
Ironically, some commentators have now questioned whether Chi-
na in the future will become the champion of the existing maximalist
system, which could suit China better than other developed countries.
The changing dynamics in the global economy and the improved tech-
nological capabilities in China therefore could result in a role reversal.'
In a recent article, Jerome Reichman also questioned whether developing
countries should still follow the developed countries' lead in adopting
their intellectual property system, as opposed to leading in the know-
ledge economy by building their own comparative advantages.'25
III. POLICY OPTIONS
The Previous Part identifies three unintended consequences
brought about by the strengthening of intellectual property protection
and enforcement in China. This Part suggests the policy changes needed
finalreport2008.pdf (providing an important study on limitations and exceptions).
123. YouTube provides a good example. See generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright
and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 897-99 (2011) (discussing
the benefits of YouTube).
124. Thanks to Pedro Roffe for making this insightful observation.
125. See Reichman, Twenty-First Century, supra note 81, at 1126. As Professor
Reichman wrote:
To the extent that intellectual property laws do play an ancillary but important
role, there are, roughly speaking, two different approaches on the table. One is
to play it safe by sticking to time-tested IP solutions implemented in OECD
[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries, with
perhaps a relatively greater emphasis on the flexibilities still permitted under
TRIPS (and not overridden by relevant [free trade agreements]). The other ap-
proach is to embark on a more experimental path . . . that advanced technology
countries currently find so daunting.
Id.
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to respond to the challenges caused by those unintended consequences.
Specifically, this Part discusses the need for adjustments to domestic, bi-
lateral, and multilateral policies. Although this Part focuses on U.S. pol-
icies, it is important to note that a satisfactory response to the challenges
identified in the Article will require more than unilateral action on the
part of the United States.
A. Domestic Policy
In A Strategy for American Innovation, President Barack Obama out-
lined ways to "harness the inherent ingenuity of the American people to
ensure that [the United States'] economic growth is rapid, broad-based,
and sustained." 26 Although some people quickly, and arguably incor-
rectly, equate innovation and ingenuity with intellectual property pro-
tection and enforcement, the latter is not a prerequisite to achieving the
President's goals. As commentators have repeatedly shown, one could
promote creativity and innovation without pushing for broader and
stronger intellectual property rights.'27 In fact, if the push for broader
and stronger rights leads to the development of an unbalanced intellec-
tual property system, such effort could even stifle creativity and innova-
tion." 8
126. A Strategy for American Innovation: Securing Our Economic Growth and Prosperity,
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/innovation/strategy (last visited May 11,
2012).
127. See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 6, at 4 ("[Iun an era of fragmented produc-
tion in which each country specializes not only in specific industries but also in specific
stages of production, and in which truly novel products are produced or sourced globally
without being produced in the counties where they are developed, there are many modes
of innovation that contribute to sustainable long-term economic growth."). For discus-
sions of alternative innovation models, see generally INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC
HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 133-283 (Thomas Pogge et al.
eds., 2010) (collecting articles discussing prizes, patent pools, and open source drug dis-
covery); GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS,
CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES (Geertrui Van Overwalle
ed., 2009) (collecting articles discussing patent pools, clearinghouses, open source mod-
els, and liability regimes); UMA SUTHERSANEN ET AL., INNOVATION WITHOUT PATENTS:
HARNESSING THE CREATIVE SPIRIT IN A DIVERSE WORLD (2007) (exploring the extent to
which innovations should or should not be protected as intellectual property).
128. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (lamenting how the recent expansion of intellectual property
laws have stifled creativity and innovation); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40 (describing
how the increasing corporate control over the use of software, digital music, images,
films, books, and academic materials has steered copyright law away from its historical
design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy).
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In both the United States and other developed countries, policy-
makers have a tendency to assume that a push for stronger intellectual
property protection and enforcement will always be in their country's
best interest. However, that assumption is not always valid. Whether
stronger protection will necessarily create a competitive edge depends
largely on whether such protection will actually drive innovation and
economic development.
As China continues to push for an annual filing of millions of pa-
tents, and as it obtains more intellectual property assets from abroad,
U.S. policymakers need to question whether a focus on greater protec-
tion will always be in their country's best interest. They also need to
think more about the changing nature of the increasingly knowledge-
based economy. For instance, an economy that is dependent on Apple,
Google, and Facebook will likely need a very different intellectual prop-
erty system than an economy relying on Paramount Pictures, Time
Warner, and Viacom.
Moreover, commentators have widely noted that the protection of
intellectual property rights is only a means to an end. If the country's
end goal is to maintain a competitive edge over its major trading part-
ners, policymakers may be better off focusing on other issues, such as
education and innovation. Indeed, in the wake of the global economic
crisis, many commentators have emphasized the urgent need for policy-
makers to focus attention on these issues.12 9
In recent literature, commentators questioned the appropriateness
of funding cuts in both education"'o and R & D at a time when the coun-
129. See, e.g., NATIONAL SUMMIT ON COMPETITIVENESS, STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL
SUMMIT ON COMPETITIVENESS: INVESTING IN U.S. INNOVATION (2005), available at
http://oregonmanufacturing.org/files/NAM_1nvesting-in_1nnovation.pdf (calling for ef-
forts to "revitalize fundamental research," "expand the innovation talent pool in the Unit-
ed States," and "lead the world in the development and deployment of advanced technol-
ogies"); ANN LEE, WHAT THE U.S. CAN LEARN FROM CHINA: AN OPEN-MINDED GUIDE TO
TREATING OUR GREATEST COMPETITOR AS OUR GREATEST TEACHER 5 (2012) (calling Ameri-
ca to "revive education," "reinvest in infrastructure" and "remain focused on competive-
ness").
130. As Reed Hundt lamented:
Even while all commentators identified educational reform as the source of
new competitive energy to meet rising Asia, the [Bush] administration selected
religion and standardized testing as the two most important topics in educa-
tion. Prayer in school had nothing to do with responding to global competi-
tion. Testing could diagnose performance problems but in no way could reme-
dy them. Meanwhile the administration failed to fund fully its own education
law. It cut back public funds for college education. It discouraged American
academies from recruiting the best students in other countries.
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try needs to become more competitive.'3 ' They also lamented the re-
duced academic performance of American students vis-a-vis students
from other parts of the world, including China. 32 In fact, educational
reform is so critically important that Thomas Friedman and Michael
Mandelbaum wrote in their new book that, when President Obama of-
fered Hilary Clinton the Secretary of State position, she should have de-
clined and responded: "Today ... more than ever before, our national
security depends on the quality of our educational system. That is why I
don't want to be secretary of state, Mr. President. Instead, I want to be at
the heart of the national security policy. I want to be secretary of educa-
tion." 3 3 As these authors reasoned, drawing on their deep background
knowledge of American politics:
We don't think of education as an investment in national growth and na-
tional security because throughout our history it has been a localized,
decentralized issue, not a national one. Today, however, what matters is
not how your local school ranks in its country or state but how Ameri-
ca's schools rank in the world.13 1
HUNDT, supra note 104, at 81.
131. See id. at 91 ("Total spending on research and development adjusted for inflation
fell slightly every year. Federal spending on basic research in math and physical sciences
has declined as a percentage of GDP since the 1980s, while federal spending on research
and development for life sciences has gone up." (footnote omitted)).
132. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE Us: How
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND How WE CAN COME BACK 103
(2011) ("[W~e have an equally dangerous gap between the average American student and
the average students in many industrial countries that we consider collaborators and
competitors, including Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Finland, and those in the most devel-
oped parts of China."); HUNDT, supra note 104, at 48 ("The percentages of American stu-
dents in mathematics and science decline steadily from the freshman year of college
through the level of post-doctoral programs. Foreigners fill the spots in such pro-
grams."); JEFFREY SACHS, THE PRICE OF CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING AMERICAN VIRTUE AND
PROSPERITY 19 (2011) ("The quality of the labor force will be the most important single
determinant of American prosperity in the decades to come. The evidence, therefore,
that America's public schools are falling behind those of the rest of the world in core at-
tainments in reading, science, and math is a harbinger of a deepening crisis.").
133. FRIEDMAN & MANDELBAUM, supra note 132, at 100.
134. Id. at 100-01. In the book, the authors quoted a frank assessment of the U.S.
education system by Michelle Rhee, the former chancellor of District of Columbia public
schools:
This country is in a significant crisis in education, and we don't know it. If you
look at other countries, like Singapore-Singapore's knocking it out of the box.
Why? Because the number-one strategy in their economic plan is education.
We treat education as a social issue. And I'll tell you what happens with so-
cial issues: When the budget crunch comes, they get swept under the rug, they
get pushed aside.
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Like education, commentators are also very concerned about the
country's reduced output in R & D.'s As Friedman and Mandelbaum
continued: "At a time when the pace of change in the global economy
and the rising economic importance of knowledge make increasing in-
vestment in research and development an urgent priority, our spending
in this vital area is actually declining." 6 In a colorful list, they laid
down an interesting set of metrics to show the country's upcoming chal-
lenges:
In 2009 United States consumers spent significantly more on potato
chips than the government devoted to energy research and develop-
ment-$7.1 billion versus $5.1 billion.
China is now second in the world in its publication of biomedical re-
search articles, having recently surpassed Japan, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Italy, France, Canada, and Spain.
Federal funding of research in the physical sciences as a fraction of
GDP fell by 54 percent in the twenty-five years after 1970. The decline
in engineering funding was 51 percent.
We have to start treating education as an economic issue. We need America
to become number one again, and the one thing that can drive us toward that is
competition.
Harry Jaffe, The Education of Michelle Rhee, WASHINGTONIAN (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/the-education-of-michelle-rheel.
135. As Reed Hundt observed:
According to a task force composed of technology companies, by 2005 the
American lead in research and discovery was "eroding rapidly as other coun-
tries commit significant resources to enhance" the capacity of their citizens and
firms to compete with the United States. The American share of scientific pa-
pers and patents is declining. American citizens authored only about half the
industrial patents sought in the United States in 2004, and less than a third of
the articles in Physical Review, a physics journal. Fewer Americans choose to
study basic mathematics and science than in the past. In graduate science and
mathematics American enrollment is dropping. The number of science and
engineering doctorates granted to American citizens at American universities
fell about 12 percent from 1998 to 2002.
HUNDT, supra note 104, at 91 (footnotes omitted); see also SACHS, supra note 132, at 19
("Intellectual capital ... is also diminishing, as America ceded technological leadership
to China and other countries in areas such as renewable energy and stem cell research.").
136. FRIEDMAN & MANDELBAUM, supra note 132, at 230.
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The total annual federal investment in research in mathematics, the
physical sciences, and engineering is now equal to the increase in U.S.
health-care costs every nine weeks.
China's Tsinghua and Peking Universities are the two largest suppli-
ers of students who receive Ph.D.s-in the United States.13 7
Interestingly-and disturbingly for U.S. policymakers-while the
U.S. administration has been pushing for severe funding cuts in educa-
tion and research, China has been doing just the exact opposite. For in-
stance, China is now actively increasing opportunities for university
education, including in the areas of science, engineering, mathematics,
technology, and medicine."" The country has also dedicated considera-
ble effort to expanding R & D capabilities.' 3 ' To some extent, such ded-
137. Id. at 232.
138. See JOHN NAISBITT & DORIS NAISBITT, CHINA'S MEGATRENDS: THE 8 PILLARS OF A
NEW SOCIETY 165 (2010). As John and Doris Naisbitt noted:
Since 1979, more than 1 million Chinese have studied in more than 100 coun-
tries, and nearly 300,000 have returned home after finishing their studies. The
number of foreign students in China has also increased rapidly. Since 1979,
more than 1 million students from 188 countries have studied at 544 Chinese
universities.
Id.; see also ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at 46 ("[Elven if China is graduating only 750
000+ science and engineering undergraduates each year, that number is still 50% greater
than the United States' annual output of roughly 500 000 science and engineenng un-
dergraduates.").
139. For example, Martin Jacques wrote:
China is already the fifth leading nation in terms of its share of the world's
leading scientific publications and it is particularly strong in certain key areas
like nanotechnology. In 2006, according to the OECD, China overtook Japan
to become the world's second largest R&D investor after the US. With 6.5 mil-
lion undergraduates and 0.5 million postgraduates studying science, engineer-
ing and medicine, China already has the world's largest scientific workforce. In
2003 and 2005 it successfully carried out two manned space missions, while in
2007 it managed to destroy one of its own satellites with a ballistic missile, the-
reby announcing the intention of competing with the United States of military
supremacy in space. In due course, it seems highly likely that China will
emerge as a major global force in science and technology.
MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND
THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 385-86 (2009). Niall Ferguson concurred:
China has increased expenditure on research and development by a factor of
six in the past decade, has more than doubled the number of its scientists and
is now second only to the United States in its annual output of scientific papers
and its supercomputing capability. There remains a significant gap in terms of
international citations of Chinese reseerch, but there is good reason to expect
this to close.
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icated efforts provide a late, but timely renewal of the millennia-long
Chinese tradition of education and scientific development."
At the commercial level, China has also actively assumed new roles
that go beyond what it took up in the past two decades. Although China
has served as an original equipment manufacturer and the world's facto-
ry for shoes, clothes, toys, household products, and low-cost electronic
goods, it is now "moving rapidly to dominate global markets, not just for
labor-intensive manufactured goods, but also technologically more ad-
vanced products."' As the country becomes a more dominant player in
NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST 318 (2011). Aaron Friedberg also
noted:
Since the mid-1990s, the government has put its money where its mouth is.
Total national spending on research and development has grown even faster
than the economy as a whole, increasing its share of GDP from around .3 per-
cent in 1998 to 1.34 percent in 2005, with a goal of reaching 2.5 percent by
2020. Other "inputs" to the innovation process have increased as well, includ-
ing the numbers of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in China, students
enrolled in college and graduate school, and those receiving doctoral degrees in
science and engineering fields.
AARON L. FRIEDBERG, A CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY: CHINA, AMERICA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
MASTERY IN ASIA 234 (2011). John Orcutt and Shen Hong further observed:
From 2000 to 2006, China almost tripled its output of science and engineering
PhDs and more than quadrupled its output of science and engineering masters'
degrees. Some have predicted that China will have more science and engineer-
ing PhDs in the United States by 2010. In 2006, China graduated more science
and engineering PhDs, which compares favorably to the United States' issuance
of just under 16 000 PhDs in physical sciences and engineering in 2007.
ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at 46-47 (citation omitted).
140. Joseph Needham's lifelong work on his series of books entitled Science and Civili-
sation in China provides a good starting point for studying Chinese scientific develop-
ments. See, e.g., JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA. VOLUME 1:
INTRODUCTORY ORIENTATIONS (1956). See also BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, ON THEIR OwN TERMS:
SCIENCE IN CHINA, 1550-1900 (2005) (discussing the scientific developments in China in
the Ming and Qing dynasties); ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF CHINA: 3,000 YEARS OF
SCIENCE, DISCOVERY, AND INVENTION (2007) (discussing three millennia of science, disco-
veries, and inventions in China).
141. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS TO
KNOW Now ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 99 (2006); see also Dominic Barton, Fore-
word to LIEBERTHAL, supra note 29, at ix ("No longer can it be said that China is only a
source of low-cost manufactured goods, exporting a 'China price' to the world; many
leading Chinese businesses are rapidly moving up the value chain on the back of home-
market demand to challenge the historic global leaders."); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China
Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 208 (2006) ("Chi-
na's ambitions are vast: China seeks to maintain its dominance in labor-intensive sectors,
to gain and maintain dominance in low-technology sectors, and to eventually dominate
trade in high-technology sectors."); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 392
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the global marketplace, the economic challenge it presents to the United
States and other developed economies is likely to become more severe.
In sum, the economic and technological competition between Chi-
na and the United States can only become steeper in the near future. It
is time U.S. policymakers reassess their priorities in the areas of educa-
tion and R & D. Indeed, when this point was presented in conferences,
including this Symposium, many audience members could not help but
nod in agreement. Perhaps they were nodding because they were mem-
bers of the academic and research communities. But perhaps they were
also nodding because they foresaw the United States' upcoming chal-
lenge to compete with China, yet was disappointed by the administra-
tion's reluctance to invest in promoting the country's competitiveness.
B. Bilateral Policy
In the intellectual property arena, both policymakers and the main-
stream media in the United States have a tendency to focus on piracy
and counterfeiting in China. While those activities continue to harm
U.S. rights holders and deserve our policy attention, the picture of intel-
lectual property developments in China has become increasingly com-
plex. In fact, U.S. policymakers can no longer ignore China's emergence
as an intellectual property power. They need to consider China not as
what they want it to be, but what it actually is or what it will become.
As Bruce Lehman, the former commissioner of the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office, rightly reminded the International Trade
Commission during a public hearing on the impact of intellectual prop-
erty infringement and indigenous innovation policies in China on the
U.S. economy:
China is emerging as a technological power, graduating significantly
more scientists and engineers than the United States. Its population of
Internet users has become the largest in the world. I expect that in com-
ing decades China will have a robust system of intellectual property rights
protection and enforcement appropriate to a tech-based economy. Unfortu-
nately, that may come too late for U.S. industry. Having sheltered its own
market while developing competitive [intellectual property] based prod-
ucts and services, China will then be in a position to assert a compara-
("Although China today is considered the world's manufacturing capital, producing
shoes, clothes, toys, household products, and low-cost electronic goods, the country
eventually will move into the world's high-end market while continuing to dominate its
low-end market."); Pete Engardio, Introduction to CHINDIA: How CHINA AND INDIA ARE
REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS 4 (Pete Engardio ed., 2006) ("The idea that China will
continue to assemble low-end products while high-end manufacturing will always re-
main in advanced countries . .. is becoming outdated.").
2012] 563
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
tive advantage, based not only on cheap labor and currency manipula-
tion, but in the very areas of comparative market advantage that we in
the U.S. had envisioned in the 1990s when we negotiated what we
thought will be a fair and balanced trading relationship.14 2
In Lehman's view, the United States should take advantage of the present
window when it still has a comparative edge over China in both the
technological sector and intellectual property-based goods and services.
It will be too late if China is able to close that window and catch up with
the United States.
Thus far, the U.S. foreign intellectual property strategy has focused
mostly on pushing China to strengthen intellectual property protection
and enforcement. However, it is time policymakers think more about
the unintended consequences of such a focus-for example, how streng-
thening intellecthal property protection and enforcement could provide
China with a new competitive edge. It is also important for them to
consider the risks involved in betting on a world intellectual property
order that assumes that the United States will always benefit from broad-
er and stronger intellectual property rights, as opposed to having a more
moderate level of protection that benefits innovation.
In fact, commentators have begun to point out the danger of having
an obsession with intellectual property enforcement. As Dan Chow
pointed out, such obsession has now backfired on rights holders by
making piracy and counterfeiting problems in China more difficult to
tackle:
Multi-national companies (MNCs) have adopted a flawed approach to
combating trademark counterfeiting in China that is actually making the
problem worse, inciting a frenzy of counterfeiting at all-time new world
highs in China. This approach places primary emphasis on enforcement,
that is, raids on factories and warehouses used by counterfeiters, de-
struction of equipment, and confiscation and seizures of counterfeit
products. ... As any brand owner in China knows, it is possible to ob-
tain an enforcement action in the form of a surprise raid within minutes
of an in-person application before the enforcement authorities. Howev-
er, as brand owners in China also know, enforcement does not result in
any serious consequences for the counterfeiter; to the contrary, the con-
sequences of being caught as a counterfeiter are usually so insignificant
142. Written Statement of Bruce A. Lehman, President, International Intellectual
Property Institute, Before the U.S. International Trade Commission (June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/press-room/documents/testimony/332-514_003.pdf
(emphasis added). The Author of this Article also testified in this public hearing. See
Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 3, at 6-13 (expanding the ideas articulated
in the Author's oral testimony).
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that such consequences can be considered just a cost of doing business.
As a result, a strategy that focuses primarily on enforcement in a legal
system and that does not create effective deterrence actually has the un-
intended, even opposite effect, of angering counterfeiters and provoking
them to engage in even more illegal activity. Indeed, what some MNCs
have discovered is that the more enforcement they conduct, the more
their products are being counterfeited. 43
C. Multilateral Policy
There is no doubt China will become more assertive in the interna-
tional intellectual property regime as it becomes more powerful and
technologically proficient. After more than a decade of experience with
the WTO and more than two decades of rapid and sustained economic
growth, it is understandable why China wants to join Brazil and India as
the leaders of the developing world."14 Although China has intentionally
kept a low profile on international intellectual property matters, it now
has strategically positioned itself as a norm maker, in addition to being a
norm taker.'4 1
Part I shows that China will experience dramatic improvements in
intellectual property protection as it crosses over from the less promising
side of the intellectual property divide to the more promising one. It
remains unclear, however, whether China will be interested in retaining
the existing international intellectual property system. In fact, there is a
good chance that new intellectual property powers may want to develop
something different-something that builds on their historical traditions
and cultural backgrounds and something that takes account of their
drastically different socio-economic conditions."'
If the intellectual property positions of China and the United States
represent two ends of a spectrum, the intellectual property system they
shape is likely to be somewhere in the middle between the two.14 ' De-
143. Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China:
How a Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 749, 750
(2010).
144. See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 1.
145. See id.
146. See Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 15 ("Although there
has been wide disagreement over where the balance should be struck, the future stan-
dards are likely to fall somewhere in the middle-between what developed countries de-
sire and what less-developed countries can afford.").
147. As I explained earlier:
Although some commentators have argued that less-developed countries will
eventually make a transition to become developed countries, it is premature to
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pending on the strength of each power, and its ability to form alliances
with other members of the international community, the system will
likely swing back and forth between the two ends. Indeed, as Martin
Jacques observed, "In the long term ... China is likely to operate both
within and outside the existing international system, seeking to transform
that system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-
centric international system which will exist alongside the present sys-
tem and probably slowly begin to usurp it.""'
As excited as policymakers are about the developments in China,
they should also pay greater attention to the growing emergence of India
as both an economic and intellectual property power." 9 Like China, In-
dia is one of the widely-discussed BRICs countries, providing a large and
fast-growing market.' As Goldman Sachs analysts have stated, "India
has the potential to show the fastest growth over the next 30 and 50
years," and its "economy could be larger than all but the US and China in
30 years.""' In fact, some analysts have already predicted that India will
eventually overtake China in the latter half of the twenty-first century.5
assume that less-developed countries, once developed, will always want the ex-
isting international intellectual property system. There is a good chance that
they may want or need something rather different!
Id. at 15; see also JACQUES, supra note 139, at 178 ("However difficult and different the
circumstances China faces, it is already busy inventing its own path of development, as
Britain did as the pioneer country, the United States as the inventor of mass production,
and Japan as the innovator of a new kind of just-in-time production.").
148. JACQUES, supra note 139, at 362.
149. Indeed, China and India are so important that many commentators have dis-
cussed these two countries together. See CHINDIA, supra note 141; ROBYN MEREDITH,
THE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON: THE RISE OF INDIA AND CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
ALL OF Us (2007). As Martin Jacques observed:
China and India have much in common. They are both hugely populous coun-
tries, demographic superpowers, which are in the process of dramatic econom-
ic information. Between them they account for almost 40 percent of the
world's population. They are both continental giants, China a dominating
presence in East Asia and India similarly in South Asia. By the mid twenty-first
century they could both be major global powers.
JACQUES, supra note 139, at 338.
150. See generally JIM O'NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE
BRICS AND BEYOND 69-79 (2011) (discussing the growth potential of India).
151. Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to
2050, at 4 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99), available at
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf.
152. See MEREDITH, supra note 149, at 57 ("'China is winning the sprint, and [India is]
going to win the marathon."' (quoting Kamal Nath, India's minister of commerce and
industry)); Pete Engardio, Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, in CHINDIA,
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India is also a longstanding leader of the developing world, along with
Brazil.'"5  Although commentators have questioned whether Brazil and
India could still assert their leadership in the intellectual property arena
as they did in the past,'15 it is fair to say that the United States' relation-
ship with India will figure largely in future macro-level intellectual
property policies.
Also of great importance is the recent emergence of the African
Group. 55 For example, Zimbabwe, with one of its nationals serving as
the chair of the TRIPS Council at the time of the Doha Declaration,'5 6
was instrumental in pushing for the adoption of that declaration. 5 1
Tanzania has also been active in pushing for the development of a new
article 29bis of the TRIPS Agreement. 5  That new provision would
supra note 141, at 27 (noting that India may eventually become a stronger economic
power than China, due to its growth in workforce, fixed investment, and productivity);
Huang Yasheng & Tarun Khanna, Can India Overtake China?, FOREIGN POL'Y, July/Aug.
2003, at 74, 81 ("China and India have pursued radically different development strate-
gies. India is not outperforming China overall but it is doing better in certain key areas.
That success may enable it to catch up with and perhaps even overtake China."). But see
MEREDITH, supra note 149, at 154 ("China has proved so much more efficient than India
at development and managing its economy that th[e] scenario [that India's economy will
overtake China's] is unlikely unless China falls into political turmoil.").
153. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34
AM.J.L. & MED. 345, 349-50 (2008).
154. See Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 765 (2002) (questioning whether "India
and Brazil are prepared to provide the general leadership on intellectual property issues
that they once did").
155. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 123
(2009) (noting the increased assertiveness of the African Group).
156. Zimbabwean Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku chaired the Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in its formal meeting on June 18-22,
2001. WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT (2001) OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRIPS (2001).
He also "requested a special TRIPS Council session on access to medicines." Susan K.
Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 481, 512 (2002).
157. See Sangeeta Shashikant, The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: An
Impetus for Access to Medicines, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 141, 146 (Galle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) ("Zimbabwe, on
behalf of the Africa Group, proposed that the Doha Ministerial Conference to be con-
vened later in the same year issue a special declaration to affirm a common understand-
ing that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent members from taking measures to pro-
tect public health. . . .").
158. See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru,
Thailand and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme-The Outstanding Implementation Is-
sue on the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006).
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create an obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of ori-
gin of the biological resources and traditional knowledge used in patent-
seeking inventions.159  If the importance of the African Group grows,
U.S. policymakers will need to think more about China's ongoing en-
gagement with African countries."o
In many of these countries, the Beijing Consensus' 1 has now been
touted as a desirable alternative to the Washington Consensus,162 which
159. See id. 9 2 (requiring patent applicants to "disclose the country providing the re-
sources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country
they were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin").
160. See, e.g., AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Firoze Manji & Stephen
Marks eds., 2007) [hereinafter AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES]; CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA:
PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR HEGEMON? (2007); DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON's GIFT:
THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2011); HARRY G. BROADMAN, AFRICA'S SILK ROAD:
CHINA AND INDIA'S NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER (2007); PADRAIG CARMODY, THE NEW
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (2011); CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING'S STRATEGY FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007); CHINA INTO AFRICA:
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (Robert 1. Rotberg ed., 2008); CHINA RETURNS To AFRICA: A
RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); CHINA'S NEW
ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Dorothy-Grace Guerre-
ro & Firoze Manji eds., 2008); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND AFRICA: ENGAGEMENT AND
COMPROMISE (2006); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA'S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA (2008); THE RISE OF CHINA
AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS (Fantu
Cheru & Cyril Obi eds., 2010).
161. Joshua Ramo, the former Time foreign editor, coined the term "Beijing Consen-
sus." JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004), available at
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf. As he explained:
[The Beijing Consensus] is simply three theorems about how to organise the
place of a developing country in the world, along with a couple of axioms
about why the physics is attracting students in places like New Delhi and Brasi-
lia. The first theorem repositions the value of innovation. Rather than the
"old-physics" argument that developing countries must start development with
trailing-edge technology (copper wires), it insists that on the necessity of bleed-
ing-edge innovation (fiber optic) to create change that moves faster than the
problems change creates. In physics terms, it is about using innovation to re-
duce the friction-losses of reform.
The second Beijing Consensus theorem is that since chaos is impossible to
control from the top you need a whole set of new tools. It looks beyond meas-
ures like per-capita GDP and focuses instead of quality-of-life, the only way to
manage the massive contradictions of Chinese development. This second theo-
rem demands a development model where sustainability and equality become
first considerations, not luxuries. Because Chinese society is an unstable stew
of hope, ambition, fear, misinformation and politics only this kind of chaos-
theory can provide meaningful organization.
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the recent financial crisis has largely discredited. 16 3 The Chinese devel-
opment model has also earned great admiration among countries
throughout the developing world. In recent years, for example,
"[glovernment research teams from Iran to Egypt, Angola to Zambia,
Kazakhstan to Russia, India to Vietnam and Brazil to Venezuela have
been crawling around the Chinese cities and countryside in search of
lessons from Beijing's experience.""
Indeed, African analysts appreciate that "China understands the
challenges of governing in areas where the bulk of the population lives
in abject poverty." 65 While the Chinese model may not promote demo-
cratic society and civil liberties-the conditions U.S. policymakers often
demand-that model shows the Chinese leaders' pragmatic approach
and willingness to consider a wide variety of options.166 As Deborah
Brautigam reminded us:
Finally, the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one
that stresses using leverage to move big, hegemonic powers that may be
tempted to tread on your toes.
Id. at 11-12. For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally id.; STEFAN A.
HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: How CHINA's AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010).
162. John Williamson, an economist and a senior fellow of the Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, coined the term "Washington Consensus." John Williamson, What
Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS
HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson ed., 1990). The Washington Consensus was de-
rived from recommendations in ten different areas: (1) fiscal deficits; (2) public expendi-
ture priorities; (3) tax reform; (4) interest rates; (5) the exchange rate; (6) trade policy;
(7) foreign direct investment; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property
rights. Id.
163. See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 953, 1018-22
(2011) (discussing the battle between the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Con-
sensus).
164. MARK LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 122 (2008); see also HALPER, supra
note 161, at 31 (noting "a growing number of developing nations that are loosely con-
nected by an admiration for China"); Stephen Marks, Introduction to AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 160, at 1, 11 (citing Nigerians' appreciation of the Chinese
model for providing stability and visionary leadership).
165. Hany Besada, The Implications of China's Ascendancy for Africa 24 (Ctr. for Int'l
Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at
http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Paper_40-web.pdf.
166. See WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, ASIA, AMERICA, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
GEOPOLITICS 118 (2007). As William Overholt explained:
Chinese leaders . . . do not accept Western democratic ideology, but they ac-
cept individual practices, such as village elections, because those practices have
specific pragmatic value in reducing corruption. They want to discover and
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At the end of the day, we should remember this: China's own experi-
ments have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, large-
ly without foreign aid. They believe in investment, trade, and technolo-
gy as levers for development, and they are applying these same tools in
their African engagement, not out of altruism but because of what they
learned at home. . . . These lessons emphasize not aid, but experiments;
not paternalism, but the "creative destruction" of competition and the
green shoots of new opportunities.1 67
A better understanding of the operation of the Beijing Consensus is
important because if members of the African Group consider the Beijing
Consensus an attractive alternative model, it is plausible that they will
also embrace China's position in the international intellectual property
regime. This is particularly true when developed countries, especially
the United States, continue to neglect the needs and interests of develop-
ing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.16 8
U.S. policymakers therefore should think more about the positions
they have taken in the international arena-at both the multilateral and
nonmultilateral levels. 9 Efforts such as the highly controversial ACTA
and the equally problematic TPP have not earned the United States
much goodwill."o Even if the provisions in those agreements can nor-
mally be considered acceptable, the use of a highly nontransparent
"country club" approach to set up these agreements has made the agree-
ments appear much more problematic than they may actually be."'
Policymakers should also consider whether the United States
should rethink its competitive strategies at the international level. Al-
though many of them have a tendency to view the rise of China as a ze-
ro-sum game, a growing number of policymakers and commentators
test these things themselves, step by step, rather than succumb to foreign ideo-
logical browbeating, but they are willing to consider nearly everything.
Id.
167. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 160, at 311-12.
168. See LEE, supra note 129, at 176 ("Westerners ignored the Africans until the Chi-
nese started making deals with them."); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 163, at
996 ("During the Asian financial crisis, China also helped Thailand, Indonesia, and other
Asian neighbors-countries that have been largely ignored by the United States.").
169. See generally Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 3, at 9-12 (discussing
the rise of the nonmultilateral era).
170. See Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 4 (explaining why TPP is likely to be more
dangerous than ACTA from a public interest standpoint).
171. See Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that ACTA "is
flawed not only because it is a country club agreement but also because it is a bad coun-
try club agreement"); see also Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 3, at 1074-83 (criticizing
the "country club" approach deployed by the ACTA negotiators).
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have now embraced a nonzero-sum approach to examining the United
States' interactions with China and the ramifications for the latter's
rise.172 Consider, for example, the rise of China in the context of this Ar-
ticle. In a nonzero-sum view, the rise of China as an intellectual proper-
ty power does not necessarily mean the United States' decline as an intel-
lectual property power. Both intellectual property powers could easily
coexist and be mutually supportive.
In their new book, Run of the Red Queen, Dan Breznitz and Michael
Murphree locate in China "a remarkably profitable and sustainable mod-
el of innovation . . . [that] makes China into a critical part of the world
innovation system, but . .. does not rely on China excelling in cutting-
edge novel-product R&D."17 1 While the emergence of alternative forms
172. See generally Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, and
International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569 (2002) (advancing a nonzero-sum
approach to resolving global intellectual property disputes). As Nobel Laureate Michael
Spence recently observed:
Rebuilding an inclusive, centrist, pragmatic agenda, with a cooperative prob-
lem-solving approach to addressing it, will take time and effort, and it is impor-
tant. The challenges ahead to sustaining growth and expanding opportunity in
the final fifty years of a century of convergence are large. So also is our capaci-
ty for creativity and adaption. But to unleash it, we need to be firmly commit-
ted to inclusiveness globally and to be willing to set aside overly simple and
somewhat ideological prescriptions of the one-size-fits-all sort, regardless of
where on the political spectrum they emanate from.
MICHAEL SPENCE, THE NEXT CONVERGENCE: THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A
MULTISPEED WORLD 272 (2011).
173. BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 6, at 19. As Breznitz and Murphree elabo-
rated:
As China has become the global center for many different stages of production,
it has also developed a formidable competitive capacity to innovate in different
segments of the research, development, and production chain that are as criti-
cal for economic growth as many novel-product innovations, and perhaps even
more so. In addition, taken together, China's regional and national systems
have developed varied capabilities that amount to a specific and highly success-
ful, though inadvertently, created national model. China's accomplishment has
been to master the art of thriving in second-generation innovation-including
the mixing of established technologies and products in order to come up with
new solutions-and the science of organizational, incremental, and process in-
novation. Thus, China's innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or
incremental) innovation but also in the organization of production, manufac-
turing techniques and technologies, delivery, design, and second-generation
innovation. Those capabilities enable China to move quickly into new niches
once they have been proved profitable by the original innovator.
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of innovation in China has raised many intriguing questions concerning
industrial development and global competitiveness, the book explains
why the Chinese model can complement the breakthrough innovation
embraced by the United States and other developed countries.1 7 4  As
Breznitz and Murphree observed:
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the iPod
and the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these products with-
out China. In the world of flexible mass production, the Red Queen
country [referring to China or other countries with a similar innovation
model] needs the novel-product innovators to keep churning out new
ideas, and the novel-product-innovating countries need the Red Queen
country to keep innovating on almost every aspect of production and de-
livery. 15
In recent literature, other scholars have also articulated new theo-
ries concerning China's engagement in "cost innovation"l7 6 and "process
innovation.""' Like the form of innovation Breznitz and Murphree dis-
cussed, these new and varied forms of Chinese innovation-or "Chinno-
vation" 1 7-are easily complementary to the model of breakthrough in-
novation embraced by the United States and other developed countries.
As Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson reminded us: "Far from being a ze-
Id. at 4; see also id. at 195 (noting the need to dispel the myth concerning "the Western
techno-fetishism of novelty, which equate innovation only with the creation of new
technologies and products").
174. See id. at 206 ("[Tlhanks to the fragmentation of production, the rise of China
need not be seen as a zero-sum game by policy makers inside and outside the country.").
175. Id. at 18.
176. See generally ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6 (advancing the concept of cost
innovation and discussing its global implications). As Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson
pointed out, "The new competition from China is also disruptive because it threatens to
obsolete much of the established firms' assets, capabilities, and experience base by
changing the accepted rules of the game, undermining traditional profit models, and
growing parts of the market that incumbents are poorly equipped to serve." Id. at 55-56.
177. TAN, supra note 6, at xii. As Tan Yinglan explained:
Most of China's companies are in the stage of process innovation. Start-ups
typically learn and adopt business models from other geographies and adapt
them locally. Companies are trying to move into technological innovation via
research and development by building on their existing knowledge, the way
semiconductor firms are moving into thin film in 2010. Most Chinese firms
are still using existing technology to create products, rather than creating the
technology itself (as is done in the United States). This makes China tech mar-
kets symbiotic and complementary with the U.S. market and those in some
other countries.
Id. at 268.
178. Id. at 268.
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ro-sum game... , the emergence of Chinese companies as significant
players in the global market promises new benefits to the world's con-
sumers and new opportunities to those established companies that
choose the right responses and execute them well.""'
In sum, it is important for the United States to consider further co-
operation with China in an effort to push for new and constructive de-
velopments in the international intellectual property regime. Indeed,
commentators have increasingly discussed the need to use the G-2 mod-
el to facilitate cooperation between the two countries in response to a
large variety of global problems,'s which range from climate change to
global economic recovery. As Fred Bergsten and his colleagues re-
minded us:
It is now clear that an effective response to every major international
economic issue requires close cooperation between [China and the Unit-
ed States]. There will be no sustained recovery from the global econom-
ic crisis unless China and the United States lead it and they have appro-
priately launched by far the largest stimulus programs in the world.
There will be no renewed momentum toward trade liberalization
through the Doha Round or otherwise, a credible defense against the
protectionist pressures that have been intensified by the crisis, unless
they endorse it. There will be no international cooperation on global
warming unless they embrace it. The United States is the world's largest
deficit and debtor country, and China is the world's largest surplus and
creditor country, and without their concurrence there will be neither
resolution of the global imbalances that helped bring on the current cri-
sis nor lasting reform of the international financial architecture.' 8'
If carefully designed, this G-2 model could be easily extended to cover
intellectual property matters, such as enforcement of intellectual proper-
ty rights, protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions,
and development of measures to address global climate change.'8 2
179. ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at vii.
180. See Peter K. Yu, What Copenhagen Could Signal About U.S., China, DES MOINES
REG., Dec. 17, 2009.
181. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES X-Xi
(2008) [hereinafter BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE].
182. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 329, 378-97 (2012) (identifying ten key intellectual property agenda items that are
important to China and other countries in Asia).
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IV. A SLOWER TECHNOLOGICAL RISE?
Notwithstanding the many concerns raised in the previous Part, and
the rather alarming picture the Article has painted regarding China's
growing competitiveness, one may wonder whether China's rise as an
intellectual property power would be much slower than many have an-
ticipated. In fact, most forecasts about the interactions between China
and the United States have been forecasts at best. Quite a number of fac-
tors affect China's ability to compete with the United States in the intel-
lectual property arena.
Table 1: Indicators on Technological Developments and
Innovation Capabilities183
1United States China
COMPARISONS BASED ON 2010 FIGURES
GDP (US$M) 14,586,736,313,339 5,926,612,009,750
GDP Growth (Annual %) 3.0 10.4
GDP Per Capita (US$) 47,153 4,428
School Enrollment, Tertiary (%) 95 26
High-technology Exports (US$M) 145,497,804,512 406,089,687,684
Domestic Patent Applications 241,977 293,066
Domestic Trademark Applications 236,826 973,460
Royalty & License Fees, Receipts 105,583,000,000 830,483,814
Royalty & License Fees, Payments 33,450,000,000 13,039,546,459
Royalty & License Fees, Balance 72,133,000,000 -12,209,062,645
COMPARISONS BASED ON 2007 FIGURES
R&D Expenditure (% of GDP) 2.67 1.40
Researchers in R&D (per million) 4,673 1,077
Science/Technical Journal Articles 209,898 56,811
First, as far as technological and innovation capabilities are con-
cerned, China is still far behind the United States (see table 1). While
China may be able to compete against the United States in selected sec-
tors, it will not be able to effectively compete against the United States in
a large variety of sectors.
183. This table builds on data provided by the World Bank. See Data, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (last visited May 11, 2012). Figures from 2010 and
2007 were selected to maximize the amount of data available for comparison purposes.
As far as the latter figures are concerned, it is important to remember that technological
and innovation capabilities have dramatically increased in China since 2007.
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To some extent, the debate about China's improvement as a tech-
nological power is similar to the ongoing debate about China's elevation
as a military power. Even with the active and continuous growth of its
military budget, it is unlikely that China will be able to quickly catch up
with the United States. For many commentators, China is at best a re-
gional military power.' Instead of challenging the United States direct-
ly, how it will behave in the military arena is likely to affect the United
States' strategic interests in other parts of the world."' The same is like-
ly to be true in regard to China's technological rise.
Second, the Chinese economy is rather complex, and developments
have been highly uneven-both geographically and across economic and
technological sectors.186 As I have noted, such developments have re-
sulted in the country's taking a somewhat "schizophrenic" position in the
184. Compare Gerald Segal, Does China Matter?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 24,
30 ("China is less like the Soviet Union in the 1950s than like Iraq in the 1990s: a re-
gional threat to Western interests, not a global ideological rival."), with Bates Gill, China
as a Regional Military Power, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY
OF GERALD SEGAL 124, 142 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary Foot eds., 2004). As Dr. Gill ob-
served:
Within a narrow regional security context, we can see that China is worthy of
greater concern and attention. China is transforming itself from a land-based,
heavily mechanized force to one with air and sea capabilities for operations
within several hundred miles of its shores. This is a change of historical pro-
portions for the [People's Liberation Army], and one that China's regional
neighbours are watching warily.
Id.
185. As Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's senior minister, insightfully observed: "If you
compete with America in armaments, you will lose. You will bankrupt yourself. So,
avoid it, keep your head down, and smile, for 40 or 50 years." It's Stupid to Be Afraid,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,151
8,369128,00.html (providing an interview with Lee).
186. As I observed earlier:
Although the subsequent founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949
helped centralize the country to a certain extent, strategic planning in the
country's formative years and the rapid economic development in China within
the past two decades have led to greater economic development in certain parts
of China at the expense of others. In Deng Xiaoping's words, "some people
have to get rich first." As a result, there are now enormous disparities across
the country in the levels of wealth and income, the purchasing power of local
consumers, and the stages of economic and technological development.
Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual Proper-
ty Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 412, 421-22 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Three
Questions] (footnotes omitted). See generally Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 203-13
(discussing the wide regional and sectoral disparities in China).
5752012]1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
international intellectual property arena.1 7 While China prefers to have
stronger protection of intellectual property rights in entertainment,
software, semiconductors, and selected areas of biotechnology, it re-
mains reluctant to increase protection for pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs. Such preferences are the combined re-
sult of a huge population, the country's continued economic dependence
on agriculture, the leaders' worries about public health issues, and the
general concerns about the people's overall well-being." As a result of
its "schizophrenic" preferences, China is likely to be on the side of the
developing world with respect to some issues, but on the side of the de-
veloped world with respect to others.
In fact, the complex internal economic conditions have made it dif-
ficult for China to develop an effective and coherent national strategy.
After all, strategies that work well for major cities, like Beijing, Shanghai,
and Guangzhou, may not work well for the countryside. 189  Likewise,
strategies that excel in prosperous coastal areas may not work for the
poor rural west. Indeed, one of the biggest challenges for China is to
come up with nationwide solutions that respond well to the country's
complex and divergent conditions and varying R & D capabilities.
Third, most of the important intellectual property developments
discussed in this Article concern patents. Although China has the
world's fastest growing and largest Internet population,190 its censorship
policy and heavily controlled information environment"' greatly stifle
creativity and may therefore prevent dramatic improvements from taking
place in the copyright area. Due to variations in policy goals, adminis-
187. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (explaining why intellectual
property developments in China should not be analyzed as if the country were homoge-
neous).
188. See id. at 26.
189. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 963 ("[Olne needs to recog-
nize China as a 'country of countries,' rather than a homogenous one.").
190. See CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, 29TH STATISTICAL SURVEY
REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 4 (2012), available at
http://wwwl.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2012/2/27/112543.pdf (providing official statistics
stating that China has the world's largest internet population, which amounted to over
513 million users in December 2011).
191. See generally Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L LJ. 1,
28-32 (2001) (discussing the Chinese censorship and information control policies).
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trative structures, and ideological obstacles, improvements may also vary
greatly from one branch of intellectual property law to another.19 2
Moreover, a widening gap is slowly emerging in the U.S.-China in-
tellectual property debate between those U.S. industries driven by copy-
right protection, such as the movie and music industries, and those dri-
ven by patent protection."' It remains to be seen whether the
bifurcation of this debate would result in greater variations in the exter-
nal pressure exerted on China in different areas of intellectual property
law.194 If such variations exist, improvements in these areas may vary
even further.
Fourth, as with the recent analysis of the BRICs countries, the fore-
casts of China as an intellectual property power depend on a continued
trend of development. Two decades ago, many predicted that Japan
would catch up with the United States, only to be disillusioned by the
Asian economic crisis.19 5 The authors of the now-famous study of the
192. As I noted in an article published before the State Council's adoption of the Na-
tional Intellectual Property Strategy, which provided a major push in the patent area:
Compared to copyrights and patents, trademark protection will create fewer
obstacles to China's m odernization efforts. Trademarks "were a state planning
tool before they became a marketing device and private property," and trade-
mark registrations continued even during the Cultural Revolution, although
they have been decentralized and politicized, and manufacturers had used such
"politically correct" pseudonyms and non-identifying labels as "Red Flag," "East
Wind," and "Worker-Peasant-Soldier." By contrast, copyright protection affects
the country's ability to maintain cultural and media control and may have a
negative impact on its extensive propaganda efforts, while patent protection
slows down the country's efforts by draining foreign exchange reserves in the
form of royalty and license fee payments. It is, therefore, no surprise that the
1982 Trademark Law was the first to be enacted after China's reopening in the
late 1970s, while the 1990 Copyright Law was the last to be enacted, only after
significant pressure by the United States.
Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 995 (footnotes omitted); see also ANDREW
MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 133-
34 (2005) (noting that "the copyright bureaucracy ... is embedded within a xitong [func-
tional bureaucratic system] that concerns itself with cultural, ideological, and value-
laden media and is therefore involved in a more politically sensitive environment, even if
technical copyright issues themselves are no more or less 'political' than those pertaining
to patents or trademarks").
193. Such a gap exists in other intellectual property debates. See Peter K. Yu, ACTA
and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 13-15 (2011) (discussing the complex domestic
politics implicated by the ACTA negotiations).
194. See generally Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 1, at 138-40 (discussing the
USTR's section 301 process).
195. See HUNDT, supra note 104, at 14-15 (discussing the eventual triumph of the U.S.
economy over Japan's). See generally EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR
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BRICs countries also included the following qualification: "Our projec-
tions are optimistic, in the sense that they assume reasonably successful
development.... There is a good chance that the right conditions in
one or another economy will not fall into place and the projections will
not be realized."196 Indeed, as the histories of both China and elsewhere
have shown, many factors could disrupt the trend of successful devel-
opment. These factors range from bad governance to natural calamities
to wars to civil unrest.'9 Rampant corruption and local protectionism
could also slow down China's rise as an intellectual property power, the-
reby preventing the country from realizing its full potential.198
Finally, it is always difficult to prognosticate in a highly dynamic
situation, such as one concerning the intellectual property and innova-
tion systems.199 While China may be able to greatly improve its competi-
tiveness on an absolute scale, how well it performs on a relative scale will
depend on the policies of other countries, such as members of the Euro-
pean Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United
States. The more U.S. policymakers consider the challenges Part II iden-
AMERICA (1979) (examining Japan's development into one of the world's most effective
industrial powers).
196. Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 151, at 3-4.
197. Cf. Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 31, at 354 (noting the "decades of war-
lordism, wars, famines, revolutions, and political turmoil" before China finally regained
stability in the late 1970s).
198. See Tao Jingzhou, Problems and New Developments in the Enforcement of Intellec-
tual Property Rights in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE IN CHINA:
CHINESE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 107, 109 (Paul Torremans et al. eds., 2007) (listing
local protectionism as "the greatest barrier to intellectual property rights protection in
the PRC"); Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 26 (2000) ("Local protectionism in China is widespread and poses probably
the single most significant problem in enforcement against counterfeiting. The trade in
counterfeit goods has now become a major and vital portion of some local economies,
providing employment for otherwise unemployable workers and generating significant
revenue for the local economy."); Li Yiqiang, Evaluation of the Sino-American Intellectual
Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local Protectionism Problem, 10
COLUM.J. ASIAN L. 391, 395-401 (1996) (discussing the problems of local protectionism
in the context of intellectual property enforcement); Yu, Three Questions, supra note 186,
at 421-22 (discussing the problems of local protectionism in China). Thanks to Bill
Hennessey for pushing the Author on this particular point.
199. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 109, at 15 (noting the difficulty of predicting the future
for "a society that is at the cutting edge of [technological] change"); ORCUTT & SHEN, SU-
pra note 6, at 69 ("One reason that innovation systems are so difficult to analyze, and
therefore thoughtfully improve, is their incredibly dynamic nature.").
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tifies, the more likely they will push for policies that help the United
States maintain its competitive edge.2 0
CONCLUSION
This Article presents a tale of the rise and decline of the intellectual
property powers. While some would reject this tale outright, finding it
implausible, others would consider it highly alarming. Although the Ar-
ticle seeks to paint a picture of the rise of China as an intellectual prop-
erty power, it remains much more tentative in prognosticating the Unit-
ed States' decline as an intellectual property power. In fact, it is very
plausible that the two powers could coexist; most likely, they would do
so. They could complement each other. They could also work together
to shape the international intellectual property and trading regimes.20'
It is important that policymakers in both China and the United
States develop a better and deeper understanding of the implications of
China's rise as an intellectual property power and what such a rise
would mean for the United States. By thinking more about the rise and
decline of the intellectual property powers, and the conditions under
which a country will cross over the intellectual property divide, we may
be able to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the intellectual
property system. We may also be able to better tackle the global piracy
and counterfeiting problems while exploring whether a careful and stra-
tegic recalibration of the existing intellectual property system could help
accelerate the crossover process for countries in the developing world.
200. But see SACHS, supra note 132, at 259 ("No matter what success the United States
has in recovering its dynamism and vitality in the years ahead, it is almost inevitable
(barring global catastrophe) that America's relative economic position will decline.").
201. As Fred Bergsten and his colleagues pointed out in other contexts:
The United States should. . . implement a subtle but sharp change in its basic
economic strategy toward China. Instead of focusing on bilateral problems and
complaints, and seeking to coopt China into a global economic system that it
would try to continue leading by itself, the United States should seek to devel-
op a true partnership with China to provide joint leadership of that system,
even if the system requires substantial modifications to persuade China to play
that role. The two economic superpowers should begin to pursue together the
development of coordinated, or at least cooperative, approaches to global issues
that can be resolved effectively only through their active co-management. Such
a "G2" approach would accurately recognize, and be perceived by the Chinese
as accurately recognizing, the new role of China as a legitimate architect and
steward of the international economic order.
BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE, supra note 181, at 22-23.
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The oft-repeated story about China as a major pirating nation is too
simple and too outdated. Although that story fits well within the fifteen-
second sound bites usually found in media reports, it does not fully cap-
ture the reality. There is no denying that China still has significant pira-
cy and counterfeiting problems. However, we should also not ignore the
highly important, and increasingly more important, story about China's
technological rise. Hopefully, this Article will inspire us to think more
about this largely omitted story and what it means for the intellectual
property policy debate.
